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Abstract  
There is a growing shift in environmental management tools from the traditional command 
and control approach to market mechanisms where environmental goods and services are 
assigned market values to generate incentives for environmental protection. In November 
2007, the Sabah state government announced a joint venture with New Forests Pty. Ltd. to set 
up a Wildlife Conservation Bank at Malua Forest Reserve. In doing so, Malaysia will be the 
first country to sell biodiversity credits in Southeast Asia. Targeting oil palm businesses, energy 
companies and the biofuel sector as potential buyers of credits, it is a presumed move to 
improve the palm oil industry s environmental portfolio by engaging them in conservation 
initiatives. This study seeks to understand how the Malua bank will be established, local 
stakeholder perceptions and the potential challenges and benefits of implementing biodiversity 
banking in Malaysia. The study was conducted based on literature review and interviews with 
identified stakeholders. Although there is great potential and interest for the adoption of 
market mechanisms in Malaysia, it was found that there are still concerns regarding the 
transparency, credibility and permanence of the scheme owing to a lack of legislative support 
and obligation for biodiversity offsets at a national or state level. Furthermore, the newness of 
the scheme meant that there are gaps in knowledge and expertise among local conservation 
groups and government agencies which may affect the outcome of the Malua bank. The final 
details on the bank set up are still under deliberation and will only be finalised in June 2008. 
As such, the conclusions of this study remain preliminary. Further work needs to be done on 
whether voluntary or regulatory offset schemes would work best in Malaysia and how benefits 
from market schemes can be passed on to local and indigenous communities in an equitable 
manner.  
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Executive Summary  
The past decade has seen a steady rise in application of market mechanisms to provide 
payment for ecosystem services in order to generate incentives for long term environmental 
protection. The shift towards payments for ecosystem services (PES) is a reflection of the 
inadequacy of traditional command and control regimes to deal with environmental 
problems. Conservation purist may balk at the idea of putting a price on nature. However, the 
idea is not to put nature on sale to the highest bidder but to generate incentives that would 
allow say a piece of forest to compete with other alternative land use types such as oil palm 
plantations which are perceived to be more profitable. 
In November 2007, the Sabah state government announced a joint venture with New Forests 
Pty Ltd, an Australian based company to set up a Wildlife Conservation Bank at Malua Forest 
Reserve. In doing so, Malaysia will be the first country to sell biodiversity credits in Southeast 
Asia. New Forests will invest an estimated USD 10 million to fund the rehabilitation and 
protection of the Malua reserve in return for the rights to market and sell the biodiversity 
credits while ownership of Malua will be retained by the Sabah government. Although said to 
model the United States Conservation Banking scheme in which developers are legally 
required to offset their activities by purchasing credits, purchase of the Malua credits is 
voluntary for now. 
Targeting oil palm businesses, energy companies and the biofuel sector as potential buyers of 
the credits, it is presumably a move to improve the palm oil industry s environmental portfolio 
by engaging them in biodiversity conservation initiatives. Malaysia is currently the world s 
largest exporter and 2nd largest producer of crude palm oil. Of late, the environmental image 
of palm oil has taken quite a blow with international NGO s such as Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth and Wetlands International linking oil palm cultivation with deforestation, 
biodiversity loss and large greenhouse gas emissions from the destruction of peatlands and 
forest fires. This has lead to retail boycotts of products made from unsustainable palm oil 
and the introduction of sustainability criteria on biofuel feedstock in the proposed EU 
Directive on Renewable Energy Resources and Fuel Quality which is seen to be extremely 
unfavourable towards palm oil. 
The announcement of the joint venture came at a time when the Sabah Forestry Department 
(SFD) is undertaking huge conservation initiatives in the Ulu Segama-Malua (USM) Forest 
Reserve (within which the proposed bank will be located). The USM area is said to be the 
home to the highest population of orang utans in Borneo and a host to several other flagship 
species such as the Borneon pygmy elephant and the Sumatran rhino. However much of USM 
is said to be degraded due to decades of unsustainable logging prompting the Sabah state 
government to stop all logging activities in the area for rehabilitation purposes. Several 
mechanisms are currently in place such as Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) by SFD and 
Yayasan Sabah s INFAPRO and RIL project which generates voluntary carbon offsets credits 
via carbon sequestration by reforestation activities. The introduction of biodiversity banking 
could be a start for other similar market mechanisms to fund the rehabilitation of Sabah s 
forests with a potential broader application for conservation in the rest of Malaysia. 
Five stakeholder groups were interviewed for this study and they are government agencies, oil 
palm plantation owners, investors and customers, industry organisations and environmental 
NGOs. Although there are worries that the purchase of credits could serve as a greenwashing 
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tool for the palm oil sector and that balanced tradeoffs cannot actually be made, there is 
general consensus among conservation groups that initiatives like the Malua bank could 
generate funds for conservation activities that would otherwise go begging. Stakeholders have 
also brought up concerns surrounding the issue of transparency and governance which they 
feel are important in increasing the credibility of the scheme. There are also mixed responses 
on whether the voluntary nature of the scheme. While there are some who feel that there 
would be sufficient demand and interest in the credits, one interviewee felt that the purchase 
had to be a regulatory requirement before sufficient demand can be generated. Furthermore, 
regulation would ensure uniformity across the board. It is also interesting to note that 
previous studies on biodiversity offsets and conservation banking in the United States have 
pointed out that regulatory obligation is a key factor in driving the demand for biodiversity 
credits. Although not the focus of this study, it was acknowledged that local and indigenous 
communities whose livelihoods depend on forests are important stakeholders and for any 
market mechanisms to be credible, the rights and concerns of this group should be respected. 
It is still unclear how (and if) benefits from the Malua scheme would trickle down to these 
communities. 
PES mechanisms such as biodiversity offset and trading schemes are already in use in some 
countries such as United States, Australia, Costa Rica and Brazil, but the concept is still pretty 
new among government agencies, NGOs and the private sector in Malaysia. There is a great 
need for capacity building among the local stakeholders who are currently reliant on external 
expertise in PES. Although there is increasing interest in adopting more PES schemes in the 
future, the gaps in local knowledge and expertise have to be addressed to ensure effective 
implementation. 
There is also concern over the extent of additionality. It is recognised that the banking scheme 
would result in rehabilitation of degraded forests which may or may not have been vulnerable 
to conversion into oil palm plantations. However, Malua Forest is a permanent forest reserve 
and even though it is a production forest, the area is supposed to be managed by the state so 
that it remains under forest cover. The question of perverse incentives arises in this case 
because it may enable continued unsustainable logging practices in forest reserves because the 
consequent degraded area can be turned into a bank where restoration is funded by a 
trading scheme. Furthermore, with banks being set up in areas that are already gazetted as a 
forest reserve, it does not bring any added protection to forests that lie outside state 
protection and these are the areas that are most vulnerable to development and conversion 
activities. 
It remains to be seen if the Malua Wildlife Conservation Bank would be successful enough to 
be used as a model example for the rest of the country and perhaps the region. Voluntary 
biodiversity markets are still rather new and experimental and it would take considerable time 
and some fine tuning before it can be considered an effective conservation tool. The final 
details on the Malua bank set up are still under deliberation and will only be finalised in June 
2008. As such, the conclusions of this study remain tentative. Further work needs to be done 
on whether voluntary or regulatory offset schemes would work best in Malaysia. Several 
voluntary carbon offset projects via carbon sequestration are already in place in Sabah and 
with the potential interest in REDD it could be worthwhile to conduct a comparative study on 
which type of scheme would work best and have the highest stakeholder acceptance.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
Over the years there is a growing consensus to place an economic value on the environment 
and its services in order to better ensure their long term protection (Bayon, 2008; Jenkins, 
Scherr & Inbar, 2004). Nature conservation generally comes into conflicts with other land use 
types that are more economically attractive and as such, it needs to generate some sort of a 
value to make it more attractive to the alternative (Jenkins et al., 2004). As Bayon puts it in his 
article in State of the World 2008, the current economic system advocates the removal of 
forests in favour of soybean and oil palm plantations. 
Placing a price tag on ecosystem services may be a concept that is hard to swallow for some, 
as these are considered public goods (Jenkins et al., 2004). However, it has to be 
acknowledged that proper management of resources does come at a cost. If a landowner were 
to manage his property in such a way as to enhance biodiversity (and thus public benefits), he 
incurs all the cost privately as the beneficiaries have no incentive to compensate him for this 
service (Jenkins et al., 2004). Nature may be priceless but as long as economic values are not 
attached to a species, forest or a wetland, they will be perceived as worthless in the eyes of 
developers (Bayon, 2008).  
Based on this understanding came the development of a variety of finance mechanisms to 
generate funds and create incentives for environment conservation. Sometimes called market 
creation , markets are established where non previously existed (Pearce, 2004) bringing about 
PES (payment for ecosystem services) schemes such as carbon sequestration, watershed 
protection, landscape beauty and more recently biodiversity conservation (Grieg-Gran & 
Bann) 
The strong and growing interest in developing these markets can be seen as a result of the 
ineffectiveness of the traditional command and control approach which strictly relies on 
government regulation, support and funding (Jenkins, Scherr & Inbar, 2004). Donation driven 
mechanism (especially in the developing world) is often unsustainable on both economical and 
environmental terms (Jenkins et al., 2004). The International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) did a study on 72 cases of markets for forest biodiversity protection 
services in 33 countries (mostly in Latin America and Asia Pacific). They found that the main 
buyers of biodiversity services were private corporations, international NGOs and research 
institutes, donors, governments, and private individuals while the main suppliers are 
communities, public agencies, and private individuals (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). 
International actors tend to focus on the most biodiverse and threatened habitats while local 
actors commonly focus on protecting species or habitats of particular economic, subsistence, 
or cultural value (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). 
Markets for ecosystem services potentially offer a cheaper and more efficient alternative to 
forest conservation (Scherr, White & Kare, 2003). Command and control and protected 
area approaches to conservation remain important tools but are inadequate due to a lack of 
funding to protect resources that lie outside the borders of protected areas (Scherr et al., 2003). 
For effective conservation of a particular land to be realized, it needs to be more valuable than 
the alternative uses of the land and market forces provide this opportunity (Pearce, 2004, 
Bayon; 2008). 
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There is huge potential for such markets in Malaysia as the country is a major biodiversity 
hotspot and its forested lands are increasingly falling under the threat of conversion to 
agriculture and development and unsustainable timber extraction. Protection and 
rehabilitation of remaining forest areas require huge funds that are largely dependent on 
government and local and international donors. There is an increasing need to explore more 
self sustaining sources of funding. The state of Sabah has recently announced its intention to 
set up a Wildlife Habitat Conservation Bank to sell biodiversity credits to generate funds for 
the conservation of the Malua Forest Reserve (Muguntan, 2007) which is said to harbour 
about 3000 orang utans (The Star, 2007). The pilot conservation banking project will be the 
first to be undertaken by a Southeast Asian country. New Forests will make an initial 
investment of USD 10 million in the project in return for the rights to market and sell the 
biodiversity credits (LaFrenz, 2007). The Sabah state government retains ownership of the 
forest (LaFrenz, 2007).  
Malaysia is currently the world s largest exporter and the 2nd largest producer (after 
Indonesia) of crude palm oil (Barrock, 2007). In 2007, both countries make up about 85 
percent of global production (Yusof, 2008). In 2006, 15.9 million tonnes of palm oil was 
produced from plantations covering an area of 4.17 million hectares (MPOB, 2006). The 
industry employs about 860,000 people and contributed close to USD 9.7 billion in export 
earnings in 2006 (MPOC, 2007). Palm oil is the most produced plant based oil in the world 
(see Figure 1-1). The high demand of palm oil is driven by its wide variety of uses, such as 
cooking oil, cosmetic, food additives, industrial lubricants and more recently as a feedstock in 
biodiesel production (MPOC, 2007). Palm oil can be found in about 10 percent of food 
products worldwide (MPOC, 2007).  
 
Figure 1-1: Share of Palm Oil Production in 2007 (Source: Oil World taken from MPOC website 
www.mpoc.org.my) 
According to MPOB (Malaysian Palm Oil Board) data, less than 1 percent of palm oil 
produced in Malaysia is used in biodiesel production (Yusof, 2008) however with the EU 
setting targets for renewables and biofuels in the energy and transport sector, there is a 
growing market for palm oil in biodiesel production (MPOC, 2007b). Malaysia has pledged to 
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set aside 6 million tonnes of crude palm oil (CPO) for biodiesel production and is heavily 
promoting domestic production and utilisation of biodiesel (MIDA, 2006). Currently, the 
United States (US) and EU countries are the main customers of Malaysian palm oil for 
biodiesel production (see Figure 1-2).  
 
Figure 1-2: Export Destinations of biodiesel from Malaysia (Source: Yusof, 2008)         
Figure 1-3 Major Export Destinations for Malaysian Palm Oil in 2006 (MPOC, 2007) 
However, tapping into the growing biodiesel market is not going to be an easy task. 
Responding to claims made by international NGOs such as Wetlands International, Friends of 
the Earth and Greenpeace, EU has expressed concerns over deforestation, forest fires, loss of 
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habitat, threat to wildlife and the expansion of monoculture at the expense of biodiversity, 
commonly associated with oil palm cultivation (Guerin, 2007; Damodaran, 2007). 
Consequently, the sustainability criteria imposed on biofuel feedstock in the proposed EU 
Directive on Renewable Energy Resources and Fuel Quality is seen by the industry to be 
highly discriminatory and disadvantageous to palm oil production (Guerin, 2007; Damodaran, 
2007; Barrock, 2007). The state of Oregon in the U.S. has legislated a ban on palm oil as a 
biodiesel feedstock in its biofuel programme and there are serious concerns from the 
Malaysian oil palm sector whether the other American states may follow suit (Yusof, 2007b). 
In the past several years, both the Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil sectors have attracted 
vast criticism from green NGOs as the major source of deforestation and habitat loss for 
endangered species such as the Pongo pygmaeus (orang utan) (Buckland, 2005; Brown & 
Jacobson 2005). The negative publicity has led companies and retailers such as Sainsbury, the 
Body Shop and Asda to ban palm oil from unsustainable sources from their products 
(Benjamin, 2007; Adam, 2007). Similarly, Lush, a cosmetic company, has gone as far as 
announcing a total ban of palm oil in all its products (Benjamin, 2007).  
Although spokespersons for the Malaysian palm oil industry remain defensive on the negative 
claims associated with palm oil cultivation, measures are being taken to give palm oil a greener 
image such as introduction of the RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) certification 
scheme (Barrock, 2007; Benjamin, 2007; Damodaran, 2007; Murray, 2007; Yusof, 2007a). 
Many may agree that RSPO certification is a step in the right direction, but it requires clear 
documentation and transparency along the palm oil supply chain and a study by Devisscher 
(2007) indicated that stakeholders remain unclear on how traceability along the supply chain 
can be achieved. In a very recent report, Greenpeace claimed that Unilever did not know 
where 20 percent of its palm oil came from and as for the remaining 80 percent, the suppliers 
were known but not the concession area of origin (Greenpeace, 2008).  
The Chief Minister of Sabah has called on the oil palm companies and biofuel businesses to 
support the Malua project via the voluntary purchase of credits (Muguntan, 2007) and it can 
be presumed to be a move to green the image of the industry. Sabah is the biggest palm oil 
producing state in Malaysia accounting for over 30 percent of national output and has over 1.2 
million hectares of palm oil plantations (POIC, 2007). The announcement of the Malua 
project came at a time when the state of Sabah is undertaking massive steps in rehabilitating 
large tracts of their degraded forest. The latest and biggest initiative is said to be at the Ulu 
Segama-Malua Forest Reserves within which the proposed Malua bank will be located (SFD, 
2006, The Star, 2007b). The degradation of the forest reserves is mostly due to unsustainable 
logging practices, illegal logging and illegal expansion of oil palm plantations (SFD, 2006). 
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
With rising palm oil prices and increasing demand in the edible oils market along with the 
potentially large biofuel market, the palm oil industry will definitely grow from strength to 
strength (The Star, 2008). The importance of palm oil to Malaysia s industry is undeniable and 
it is likely that forest land will come under increasing pressure for conversion to oil palm 
plantations.  
Market mechanisms that give economic value and incentives to forest conservation are crucial 
in making forests competitive with other land use alternatives. Although new to Malaysia and 
the region as a whole, the idea of biodiversity banking is a novel one and if successful, the 
Malua banking project can serve as a model case study for the entire region. 
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Thus, this study aims to answer the following research questions: 
o How will the bank be set up and how will the credits be valued?  
o What are the Malaysian stakeholders perspectives on the introduction of conservation 
banking in Sabah?  
o What are the potential benefits and challenges? 
1.3 Methodology 
The initial idea for this descriptive study was first conceived based on Malaysian press releases 
on the impending Malua bank project. The design of the thesis methodology was very much 
based on preliminary information released in these news articles. As such, the search for 
literature was based on topics relating to conservation markets, biodiversity banking, palm oil 
industry and forest management and land use in Malaysia. The information gathered from 
literature review was to serve as a foundation to understanding the key issues and experiences 
of market mechanisms for ecosystem services especially in relation to biodiversity banking and 
the potential implications on land use and oil palm cultivation in the Malaysian context. The 
literature review was also intended to assist in the identification of the focus and scope of this 
research, identification of stakeholders and the formulation of interview questions.  
Literature review was largely based on information taken from published journals, books, news articles, 
databases and online government documents. Information was also taken from websites of environment and 
development related non-governmental organizations (NGOs), oil palm trade/ industry associations and palm 
oil plantation companies. When the scheme was announced, the target market for the biodiversity credits was 
said to be palm oil and biodiesel companies. Therefore, the stakeholders selected for this study was based on a 
previous study on the Malaysian oil palm industry by Teoh (2002). Teoh had identified the key players in the 
oil palm industry as shown in        
Figure 1-4.  
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Figure 1-4: The main actors in the palm oil supply chain (Source: Teoh, 2002) 
To gain a multi stakeholder view, an attempt to interview at least one representative from each 
stakeholder group was made. Downstream producers were excluded because many companies 
in Malaysia are involved in both the upstream production (cultivation and crude palm oil 
production) and downstream activities such as refining and manufacturing of palm oil based 
products. Furthermore, among the environmental impacts of the oil palm industry, this study 
focuses more on land use and loss of biodiversity issues and these are more relevant at the 
cultivation stage (upstream production). For the purpose of this study, exporters/ importers 
stakeholder group is assumed to have a much lower impact as compared to the others and 
therefore excluded as well.  
International organizations that have conducted studies on market mechanisms for ecosystem 
services and biodiversity trading schemes such as IUCN (International Union for 
Conservation of Nature), IIED (International Institute for Environment and Development) 
and GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) were also contacted. The initial 
intention was to conduct expert interviews but it was indicated that they (researchers 
contacted) did not have specific information on the developments at Malua and most of their 
work and experiences can be found as published articles and report anyway. Consequently, 
further recommendations on reading material were taken instead. 
A s research was not conducted in the field, in-person dialogues were not possible. Instead, semi structured 
interviews were made via email correspondence or phone conversations. Where possible, local (Malaysian) 
organizations were selected for the interviews but in the case of the customer stakeholder group, European 
organizations were interviewed as most of the crude palm oil produced in Malaysia is exported and the EU is 
one of the major buyers (see Figure 1-2 and     
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Figure 1-3). Furthermore, with the proposed introduction of the EU directive on biofuels and 
the sustainability criteria on feedstock, the European market is assumed to be more sensitive 
to the environmental issues surrounding palm oil production. 
Interview questions vary depending on the stakeholder group concerned, but the interviews 
attempted to examine the following issues: 
o Their overall knowledge/confidence in biodiversity banking and the Malua project 
o Willingness to support a biodiversity banking scheme in Sabah. Why or why not? 
o Relevance of the Malua project to their business 
o Challenges and opportunities 
o Future application of similar projects in Malaysia 
Findings from both literature review and the interviews were analysed and used as a basis for 
future recommendations and identification of potential areas for further research. 
1.4 Limitations 
At the completion of this thesis, the Malua Conservation Bank project is still in the 
negotiation stage. Therefore, information gathered remains tentative. Furthermore, due to the 
newness of the scheme, many of the interviewees that are not directly involved in the 
establishment of the Malua bank (such as the oil palm sector 
 
the intended buyers), are not 
well versed with the details of the project except for what is released in the press. 
Actual field research was not conducted and thus the ability to reach out to more stakeholders 
was limited. Generally, potential interviewees are people in the top management of their 
respective organizations and are difficult to reach via email or phone. Response level was 
lower than initially expected. However, up to date conference materials relating to palm oil 
and sustainability are used where relevant as the speakers in these events are normally persons 
who are prominent in the Malaysian palm oil scene or represent huge palm oil organizations 
or environmental NGOs.  
The study mainly focuses on the potential of PES schemes such as biodiversity banking in 
Sabah based on the perspectives of industry, government and local environmental NGOs. It is 
assumed that NGOs do consider the rights and concerns of indigenous communities given 
that social and environmental aspects are very much integrated in today s world. Although it is 
acknowledged that indigenous communities that rely on forests are stakeholders in the 
establishment of the Malua banking scheme, they are excluded from the scope of this study. 
Since data collection is done offshore via email and telephone correspondence, proper 
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communication with indigenous communities will be problematic and therefore adequate 
representation of their views and perceptions may not be obtained. 
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2 Markets for Conservation 
2.1 Market oriented approaches to environmental management 
For the past two decades, interests in adopting market systems to generate economic 
incentives for environmental regulation have been steadily growing. The Command and 
Control (CAC) approach, traditionally relied on by governments to deal with issues such as 
pollution prevention, proved to be too cost ineffective due to the resources needed to 
regulate, monitor and enforce. The introduction of the sulphur dioxide (SO2) cap and trade 
program in the United States in 1990 practically revolutionized the way environmental 
problems concerning public goods were managed. By placing a cap on SO2 emissions and 
thereby limiting a public good (the absorption capacity of the atmosphere), the government 
effectively placed a price tag on a now limited resource. Emitters require a permit for each ton 
of SO2 they release.  
Market forces determine the lowest price of reducing emissions. Companies have the 
flexibility to decide the cheapest possible way to reduce their emissions (investment of 
advance technologies, change of fuel source, paying someone else to achieve the reductions by 
purchasing additional permits). The use of a market mechanism was so successful in reducing 
SO2 emissions that it led to the emergence of the carbon market to tackle climate change 
under the Kyoto Protocol. This is known as tradable permits and can be applied to limit 
emissions to control air pollution or it can be to limit extraction as in the case of fishing 
quotas or groundwater extraction.  
Other mechanisms known to generate revenue for conservation include environmental fines 
(e.g. water pollution fines in Brazil and Colombia) and deposit refund schemes and 
environmental performance bonds (Bayon, Lovink & Veening, 2000). Deposit refund 
schemes and pollution bonds are imposed on companies or individuals by the government as 
a form of liability insurance and they are usually used for extraction activities such as logging 
and mining to fund the rehabilitation and restoration efforts upon cessation of activities 
(Bayon et al., 2000). 
2.2 Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
PES is based on the principle that those who provide environmental services should be 
compensated for the cost of doing so (Grieg-Gran & Bann 2003). The four common types 
of markets for ecosystem services are briefly summarised below. 
2.2.1 Carbon sequestration 
The signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 led to the development of both regulatory and 
voluntary markets for carbon offsets including forest based carbon sequestration and storage. 
Two standard ways to increase carbon sequestration is either by the planting of new trees 
through afforestation, reforestation and agroforestry and the avoidance of emissions by 
retaining trees (avoided deforestation) (Grieg-Gran & Bann 2003). The amount of carbon in 
the atmosphere is a global issue and carbon is a uniform commodity (one ton of carbon 
dioxide is the same everywhere in the world) so it does not really matter where carbon is 
emitted or sequestrated and thus making it possible to trade offsets internationally. There has 
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been two such carbon offset initiatives in Sabah, Malaysia, the INFAPRO and RIL projects 
which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
The next big thing for carbon sequestration market may be the REDD (reducing emissions 
from deforestation and degradation of forest ecosystems) initiative which gained centre stage 
in post Kyoto negotiations during the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bali, 
Indonesia.  In support of the REDD initiative, the World Bank has set up the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF), which is designed to facilitate a large scale system of incentives 
for reducing emissions via avoided deforestation and thus provide a new source of funding for 
the sustainable use of forest resources and biodiversity conservation (Bosquet & Aquino, 
2007). The FCPF aims to develop a carbon trading system that will recognize emission 
reductions from avoided deforestation and forest degradation post Kyoto (after 2012). The 
market for such credits is projected to exceed USD 1 billion by 2014 (Bosquet & Aquino, 
2007). 
The implementation of policies regarding REDD requires effective deforestation 
measurement and monitoring systems that are consistent, accurate, reproducible and 
transparent to be implemented at the national level (Kanninen et al., 2007). Given the track 
record in forest governance in the five proposed candidate countries (Indonesia, Papua New 
Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil and Costa Rica) for the FCPF pilot carbon 
finance scheme, it is questionable if these countries can acquire the capacity to meet REDD 
commitments in the relatively short readiness phase set by the Bank (BIC, 2007). The baseline 
needs to demonstrate that the area is under threat of deforestation before credible carbon 
credits can be produced under the REDD program. Attention must also be given to the 
elimination of policies that provides perverse incentives such as reducing the costs or risks 
associated with deforestation or obstructing activities relating to sustainable forest 
management (Kanninen et al., 2007). Subsidies that enable forest clearing for agriculture, 
ranching or biofuel development to be more profitable must be removed for obvious reasons 
(Kanninen et al., 2007). Although payments would only be made out to countries that achieve 
emission reductions that are both measurable and verifiable, questions remain on how 
verification will take place and if proceeds will be channelled to poor communities and 
indigenous people that rely on forests for livelihood (BIC, 2007). Despite the unanswered 
questions, hopes are high regarding the future of REDD generated carbon credits and the 
market is projected to exceed USD 1 billion by 2014 (Bosquet & Aquino, 2007). 
Although currently there are no plans underway for REDD in Malaysia, the Malaysian 
stakeholders are nevertheless supportive of the idea and are interested in looking into future 
possibilities of adopting REDD projects (Fletcher, Theseira & Nik, 2007). Box 2-1 
summarises the latest development under REDD that is taking place in the island of Sumatra 
in Indonesia. 
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2.2.2 Watershed protection 
The type and depth of watershed services provided by forests are site specific but in general, 
forests contribute to water quality protection, water flow regulation, flood prevention, 
maintenance of aquatic habitat and soil salinization control (Grieg-Gran & Bann, 2003). . 
Downstream users are generally affected by upstream activities and payment schemes have 
developed where downstream users (beneficiaries) pay upstream users (polluters) to protect 
the forests through sustainable management activities (Grieg-Gran & Bann, 2003). One 
example of this is the New York City watershed management programme where taxes on 
water users in the city are used to compensate farmers upstream who adopt best management 
practices for the extra cost incurred (Scherr et al., 2003). In Costa Rica, a National Fund for 
Forest Financing (FONAFIFO) was set up in 1997 to compensate landowners and public 
authorities for restoration, forest management and forest conservation (Pagiola, 2002).  
2.2.3 Landscape beauty 
While landscape beauty is essential in capturing a market for ecotourism, payments for this 
ecosystem service has been underdeveloped despite it being the oldest of the four services 
considered in this section (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). Often, very little effort is used to set 
appropriate prices for access and participation by private and community landowners is low 
(Grieg-Gran & Bann, 2003). However there are those that are quick to realize their position in 
providing landscape services that are extremely rare such as the government of Rwanda which 
Box 2-1: The Ulu Masen Project 
In light of post Bali interest in voluntary carbon offsets via avoided deforestation 
initiatives, Carbon Conservation and Merrill Lynch recently announced their plans to 
offer voluntary carbon credits generated from a massive Indonesian avoided deforestation 
project at the750,000 hectares Ulu Masen forest in the Aceh province of Sumatra. The 
project is estimated to produce up to 100 million metric tonnes of offsets over a period of 
30 years. Logging at Ulu Masen is expected to be reduced by 85 % and thereby generating 
credits representing 3.3 million tons of carbon a year.  
Local villages will receive payments once they demonstrate trees have not been logged. 
Progress will be monitored from the ground by forest wardens and from the air by 
satellite images. Payments are projected to reach USD 26 million over the first five years.  
The Ulu Masen project was certified by the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance, 
which includes non- governmental organizations such as The Nature Conservancy and 
the Rainforest Alliance and companies such as Intel Corp. and Weyerhaeuser Co. In the 
long term, project managers are looking into finance mechanisms to initiate the 
sustainable cultivation of palm oil, coffee and cocoa which will be marketed under the 
brand Aceh Green .  
Companies may not use credits generated by avoided deforestation to meet pollution 
targets under the European Union's greenhouse gas program or the Kyoto Protocol.  
Source: (Zwick, 2008 and Efstathiou Jr., 2008) 
Melissa Chin, IIIEE, Lund University 
16 
introduced an entry fee if USD 250 (in the 1980s) per tourist into the home of Africa s last 
remaining mountain gorillas (Grieg-Gran & Bann, 2003).   
2.2.4 Biodiversity conservation 
Despite growing interest, the markets for biodiversity conservation remain new and 
experimental for most parts (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). There is a huge variety in the 
types of payments that are currently out there for biodiversity and they are indicated in the 
table below.  
Table 2-1: Types of payments for biodiversity protection.  
Type Mechanism 
Private land acquisition Purchase by private actors or NGOs Purchase of high-
value habitat 
(explicitly for 
biodiversity 
conservation) 
Public land acquisition Purchase by government agencies 
Bio prospecting rights Rights for the collection, testing and use of genetic 
material from a specified area 
Research permits Rights to collect specimens, take measurements and 
conduct studies in a defined area 
Hunting, fishing or 
gathering permits for wild 
species 
Right to hunt, fish and gather 
Payment for access 
to species or habitat 
Ecotourism use Rights to enter a designated area for the purpose of 
recreation such as wildlife observation, camping or 
hiking 
Conservation easements Owner is paid to use and manage a defined area only 
for 
conservation purposes (usually permanent and 
transferable upon sale of land) 
Conservation land lease Owner is paid to use and manage a defined land area 
only for conservation for a defined period of time 
Conservation concession Public forest agency is paid to maintain a defined area 
for conservation purposes only.  
Community concession in 
public protected areas 
Allocation of rights to individuals or communities to 
use a defined area of forest or grassland in exchange 
for commitment to protect biodiversity in the said area.  
 
Payment for 
biodiversity-
conserving 
management 
Management contracts for 
habitat or species 
conservation on private 
farms, forests grazing lands 
Contract that details biodiversity management activities 
and payments based on achievement of specified 
objectives 
Tradable wetland mitigation 
credits  
Purchase of credits from wetland conservation or 
restoration by developers to maintain a minimum area 
of natural wetlands in a defined region 
Tradable development 
rights 
Development rights allocated for a limited total area of 
natural habitat within a defined region 
Tradable rights 
under cap-and-trade 
regulations 
Tradable biodiversity credits Purchase of credits representing areas of biodiversity 
protection or enhancement by developers to meet 
minimum requirements for biodiversity protection 
Support biodiversity- Biodiversity-friendly Business shares in businesses that manage for 
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businesses biodiversity conservation conserving business 
Biodiversity-friendly 
products 
Ecolabelling 
(Source: Scherr, White & Khare, 2003) 
Government payment schemes are quite popular in some countries. In China, the government 
funded Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) pays farmers to maintain forest cover 
on hillsides for watershed conservation and flood prevention leading to an overall benefit to 
biodiversity (Gee, 2006). Mexico has established a programme for water conservation where 
water users are required to pay a fixed amount which will be used to protect key forested 
watershed in the country (Bayon, 2008). In Australia, the BushTender and EcoTender scheme 
established in the state of Victoria uses a reverse auction system for providing government 
funds to private landowners for biodiversity protection (Eigenraam, 2005). Landowners 
submit competitive bids for government funding to pay for improved management of their 
properties (Eigenraam, 2005). However, these schemes rely on money coming from 
government (and in some cases private donors) and the link between buyer and supplier is 
absent (Bayon, 2008). For example, in the case of Mexico, all Mexican water users pay a fee as 
a contribution to the fund that manages watershed protection but often, they are unaware of 
what they are paying for and the payment does not necessarily go to the watershed their water 
comes from (Bayon, 2008). Since these are not market based mechanisms, the price is 
determined by the government s ability to pay rather than the market value based on supply 
and demand. However, despite the weaknesses, the programmes in China and Mexico have 
succeeded in achieving an overall increase in forest cover by creating incentives and values for 
biodiversity protection (Bayon, 2008). 
This paper focuses on another type of ecosystem services payment, one that relies on market 
mechanisms, which is the trade in biodiversity credits and biodiversity offsets. 
2.3 Biodiversity Offsets and the Development of Biodiversity Markets 
The term offset has been widely used in emission trading schemes for greenhouse gases and 
sulphur dioxide (ten Kate, Bishop & Bayon, 2004). In the context of carbon trading, the 
emission of a ton of carbon dioxide can be offset by avoiding the release of a ton elsewhere or 
by removing a ton from the atmosphere. 
Biodiversity offsets are conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, 
unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss 
of biodiversity (ten Kate et al., 2004). However, offsets are applicable only when the 
developmental activities have met the necessary requirements (legal or otherwise) and all 
precaution has been taken to avoid harm to biodiversity. If the damage cannot be prevented, 
then all viable steps have to be taken to minimize the damage before offsets should be 
considered (ten Kate et al., 2004). In other words, biodiversity offsets should be considered 
last in the mitigation hierarchy (Carroll, Bayon & Fox, 2008). The types of conservation 
activities that are included in a biodiversity offset are summarised in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1: Typical conservation activities included in a biodiversity offset. (Source: adapted from BBOP, 2008 
and ten Kate & Inbar, 2008) 
Standard approaches to mitigating the environmental impacts caused by developmental 
projects have a tendency to neglect biodiversity loss, focusing instead on air and noise 
pollution mitigation (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008). The use of biodiversity offsets can help 
companies manage their biodiversity related risks more effectively, leading to a better rapport 
with authorities, NGOs and the community and thereby giving them a social license to 
operate (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008; ten Kate et al., 2004). Moreover, through the sale of credits, 
biodiversity offsets can address funding issues that frequently plague conservation activities.   
Despite the huge benefits that biodiversity offsets could potentially bring, Bishop, Kapila, 
Hicks, Mitchell, & Vorhies (2008) and ten Kate & Inbar (2008) pointed out some challenging 
issues that still need to be addressed and these are summarised as follows. 
1. Will biodiversity offsets lead to approval of projects that would otherwise be 
rejected and therefore give developers a license to trash ?  
2. How is social equity (ensuring that the rights and concerns of local and indigenous 
communities are properly taken care of) addressed? 
3. How can a suitable offset be determined so as to ensure that they provide benefits 
equal to the original ecosystem?  
4. Who is responsible for the offset and its evaluation? For how long should a 
developer be held responsible for the offset? Should developers be held 
accountable for indirect impacts? 
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5. How to ensure additionality and avoid leakage? 
6. How to secure the permanence of the offset in question?  
7. Should offsets be in place before the impact? How can this be done?  
These challenges are widely recognised among those working with biodiversity offsets and 
BBOP1 is currently working on a draft biodiversity offset design handbook to address them. 
The use of mandatory biodiversity offsets are growing in popularity and examples can be 
found in the United States, Brazil, Canada and Australia with future possibilities in European 
countries under the Environmental Liability Directive that was passed in 2004 (Bishop et al., 
2008). Legally required biodiversity offsets have been practised for almost two decades in the 
United States in the form of Wetlands Mitigation Banking and Conservation Banking (also 
known as Endangered Species Mitigation Banking) and this will be discussed further in the 
next section.  
Unlike the carbon trading scheme, where a ton of CO2 emitted (a homogenous commodity) 
can be compensated by another ton of CO2 avoided elsewhere, biodiversity is a lot more 
complex. Biodiversity composition is site specific. For example, it would not make sense to 
offset the draining of tropical peat swamps for agricultural conversion by conserving a piece 
of mountainous temperate forest. Although both may be ecologically valuable, they are too 
different to be treated on equal terms. For this reason, the future trade of biodiversity credits 
in an international market is unlikely but there is still great potential for it to be a profitable 
business venture at local, national and corporate levels (Bishop et al., 2008). Recognising this, 
some pilot initiatives on voluntary biodiversity offsets have started to take off in countries 
where compensation for biodiversity loss is not legally required (Bishop et al., 2008; Bayon 
2008). The focus of this study, the Malua Wildlife Conservation Bank, is one such initiative. 
To provide some understanding on how biodiversity banking works, an overview of the 
conservation banking experience in the U.S. is provided in the next section. 
2.3.1 Experiences in Conservation & Biodiversity Banking 
Conservation banking in the United States first had its roots in wetland mitigation banking 
under the Clean Water Act 1972 (Mead, 2008). In the context of wetland mitigation banking, 
developers are required to offset their negative impacts on a wetland by the creation, 
restoration, enhancement, or preservation of a similar wetland habitat elsewhere (Bean et al., 
1999). To achieve the no net loss goal stipulated by the policy, each hectare of damaged 
wetland has to be compensated by a hectare (sometimes more) of comparable wetland that is 
restored or recreated in a defined service area (Kate et al., 2004). Wetland credits are usually a 
measure of acreage (Weems & Canter, 1995, Bean et al., 1999). 
Similarly, conservation banking requires that the impacts to endangered, threatened or 
protected species (as listed under the Endangered Species Act 1973 (ESA)) be compensated 
for by the purchase of credits representing either individuals or habitat (Mead, 2008). Before 
the introduction of conservation banks, ESA protected species were conserved on a project-
                                                
 
1 Business and Biodiversity Offsets Program (BBOP) is an international partnetship of more than 50 companies, 
governments, conservationists and financial institutions led by Forest Trends and Conservation International. 
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by-project basis which eventually led to a highly fragmented approach to conservation because 
habitats were managed individually (Bauer et al., 2004).  
USFWS (United States Fish and Wildlife Service) defines a conservation bank as a piece of 
land of high conservation value (i.e. containing species that are endangered, threatened or at 
risk) that is permanently protected and managed (USFWS, 2003). The first official 
conservation bank was established in the state of California in 1995 and in 2003 USFWS 
issued Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Conservation Banks as a federal 
guideline for conservation banking by public or private bodies.  
Under the ESA, activities that harm an endangered species by modifying its habitat are 
prohibited without a permit and can lead to severe penalties (Bauer et al., 2004). This means 
that from a landowner s perspective, having land that is a habitat for an endangered species 
brings about all kinds of legislative restrictions pertaining to land use which may force them to 
forgo economic revenue from the use of the land (Bauer et al., 2004). In the past (before the 
introduction of the banking scheme) these restrictions under the ESA has led to perverse 
incentives as landowners resort to get rid of the animals either by killing them (before the 
authorities got to know about their presence) or by land management practices that make the 
habitat unfavourable to these animals (Bauer et al., 2004). Conservation banking enables the 
landowners to convert this liability into an economic asset by establishing a bank and 
generating income by the sale of credits (Bauer et al., 2004). With credit prices ranging from 
around USD 7,000 
 
300,000, it is not surprising that 91 percent of conservation banks 
surveyed in a study by Fox & Nino Murcia (2005) stated that financial motives are the main 
driver for their establishment. Banks in the U.S range from 10 to 4,210 hectares (Fox & Nino 
Murcia, 2005). Some banks allow for activities that are compatible with the ecological 
objectives of the bank such as grazing, hunting, hiking and so forth and in some cases these 
activities contribute to the overall health and conservation of habitat (Fox & Nino Murcia, 
2005; USFWS, 2004). Moreover, 73 percent of the land in U.S. is privately owned, and most 
Box 2-2: Carlsbad Highland Conservation Bank A merica s First Conservation Bank 
Carlsbad Highland is located in San Diego County and consists of coastal sage scrub, an 
important habitat of the coastal Californian gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica californica), an 
increasingly threatened songbird due to habitat loss. The Bank of America acquired the 
263 acre Carlsbad Highlands at about the same time the gnatcatcher was added to 
California s endangered species list. Consequently, the bank found that its development 
options for the land became increasingly limited and expensive. At the same time, the 
California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) was building a highway on prime 
gnatcatcher habitat and due to the bird s endangered status; CalTrans was required to 
mitigate the impact of the project. CalTrans ended up paying the Bank of America to put 
a conservation easement on 83 acres of Carlsbad Highlands in return for a certain number 
of gnatcatcher mitigation credits. The remaining 180 acres were developed into the 
Carlsbad Highlands Conservation Bank. Thus, in 1995, the first conservation bank was set 
up. The Carlsbad Highlands Bank has since sold about 180 mitigation credits at a value of 
USD 10,000 to USD 15,000 per credit. Since then, over 60 conservation banks have been 
approved in the U.S with the majority of them being in California. 
Source: ten Kate et al. (2004), Bauer et al. (2004), Mead (2008), USFWS (2004). 
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of the threatened and endangered species live on these private lands, therefore it is important 
to engage the private landowners in conservation efforts (Bauer et al., 2004). 
A conservation bank is made up of four main parts which are the conservation bank 
agreement, conservation easement, management plan and financial guarantees (Hill, 2008). 
Before a conservation bank can be established, a conservation bank agreement has to be 
drawn up between the conservation bank owner and a regulatory body such as the USFWS to 
determine the terms and conditions under which the bank will be set up and operated 
(USFWS, 2003). A conservation easement ensures the protection of the bank in perpetuity 
and requires the owner of the property, grantor to relinquish certain development rights to 
the grantee which must be a government body (Hill, 2008). The management plan 
determines the operations and performance objectives of the bank and includes statement of 
management activities, identification of funds required, identification of permissible or 
prohibited activities, monitoring and reporting requirements, identification of responsible 
person or parties, accounting system to track credits and funding, and a comprehensive record 
of biological value (vegetation map or species inventory) (USFWS, 2003). The bank s main 
funding comes from an endowment fund made up of a percentage of credit sales (Hill, 2008). 
The ecological value of the land is translated into credits that can be sold to fund the 
management of the bank in perpetuity (USFWS, 2003). One credit can equal one acre of 
habitat or an area supporting a nesting pair or it may refer to specific species (e.g. red 
cockaded woodpecker credits) (Kate et al., 2004) and if the bank has more than one ESA listed 
species then the bank may have more than one credit type (USFWS 2003). Since there will be 
differences between the quality of habitat that will be impacted by development and the 
quality of the habitat used as an offset, a balance is calculated via a credit ratio (USFWS, 2003). 
Ratios are applied to ensure that mitigation measures are proportionate to the scale of impact. 
If the project results in impacts of small magnitude and takes place in a habitat of low quality, 
a mitigation ratio of 1:2 (one bank acre to two project acres) might be granted. On the other 
hand, if a project results in large scale impacts on a large area of high quality habitat, the 
developer might be expected to mitigate at a ratio of 2:1 (two bank acres to one project acre) 
or higher (USFWS, 2003).  
There are two kinds of credits 
 
preservation credits and creation credits (Hill, 2008). 
Preservation credits are allocated to habitats that already exist and are functioning whereas 
creation credits are allocated when there is a need for restoration, enhancement or creation of 
desired habitat (Hill, 2008). Creation credits usually require more consideration as 
conservation outcome is uncertain and these credits are usually allocated after certain 
performance objectives are met (Hill, 2008). When valuing credits, the two important factors 
to consider are area and quality of habitat (Kate et al., 2004). Since it is preferable for the 
compensation or offset to take place as close to the impacted site as possible, a service area 
has to be determined (USFWS, 2003). The service area is the geographic area where credits 
from a bank can be sold for compensation purposes (USFWS, 2003). Usually, the service area 
is within 40 miles from the bank site (Kate et al., 2004). Conservation banks provide a simple 
and economical alternative to developers through a one-time purchase of credits that not only 
saves time and money but also provides regulatory certainty and the transfer of liabilities to a 
third party (Sheahan, 2001; Weems & Canter, 1995; USFWS, 2003). Conservation bankers can 
also use banks to meet their own expected future mitigation needs. Transport agencies in the 
US have set up banks to generate sufficient mitigation credits for future highway projects 
(Bauer et al., 2004). Conservation banking allows for the establishment of large reserves that 
are more likely to ensure ecosystem functions, enhance biodiversity and increase population 
viability of endangered species (USFWS, 2003).  
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Protection of open spaces and conservation of biodiversity are better facilitated especially 
when conservation banking works in concert with regional conservation planning. Economy 
of scale is achieved as the management of a large piece of land under the bank is more cost 
effective than the management of several small areas (USFWS, 2004). By consolidating many 
small areas into several larger conservation grounds, regulatory agencies face fewer problems 
in enforcement and compliance issues (Sheahan, 2001) and at lower costs as an economy of 
scale is achieved (USFWS, 2004).  
There has yet to be any comprehensive study on the success or failure of the US conservation 
banking scheme from the ecological perspective. Has its introduction reduced the impact of 
habitat loss and fragmentation and aid the recovery of endangered species? Based on the 
information available, it is still not clear (Fleischer & Fox, 2008). Studies by Fox & Nino-
Murcia (2005) and ten Kate et al. (2004) have indicated that strong regulatory support is a key 
component in the success of conservation banking. According to Fox & Nino-Murcia (2005), 
it is the enforcement of mitigation requirements that drive the demand for credits as shown in 
the state of California, where strong implementation of both federal and state biodiversity 
protection laws has made the establishment of banks attractive due to the high credit prices 
and the high availability of potential buyers.  
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3 Oil Palm and Land Use in Sabah, Malaysia 
3.1 An overview of land use patterns in Malaysia 
Malaysia is situated near the equator in the Southeast Asian Region. The country consists of 
two parts, Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia (Borneo part), separated by the South China 
Sea. The country is made up of thirteen states, eleven in the Peninsular side and two (Sabah 
and Sarawak) in Borneo. Peninsular Malaysia was formerly known as Malaya, a British colony 
that gained independence in 1957. In 1963, Malaya joined forces with Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore (all former British colonies) to form the Federation of Malaysia (Singapore left the 
Federation to form an independent republic in 1965). Due to its colonial history, the 
Malaysian government system closely resembles the British system.  
The Malaysian climate is tropical with high humidity, high annual rainfall and temperatures 
ranging between 21°C and 34°C. The country is also blessed with many natural resources such 
as petroleum and natural gas, large tracts of tropical rainforest, diverse flora and fauna and a 
number of mineral resources. In the 1960s and 1970s the Malaysian economy was heavily 
reliant on timber, tin and rubber and although agricultural sector remains important, the 
economy has since diversified to include manufacturing and service industries (National 
Economies Encyclopedia, 2007). Currently Malaysia is a net exporter of manufactured goods 
mainly electronics and electrical products (MIDA, 2007). The country s population is slightly 
over 27 million people with a per capita income of USD 6,092 (MIDA, 2007).           
Figure 3-1: Malaysia s main exports in 2006 (Source: Department of Statistics 2007 in MPOC 2007) 
Malaysia has a land area of 32.8 million hectares (FAO, 2007) of which about 6 million is 
agricultural land (Yusof, 2006) and 20.9 million is considered to be forest (FAO, 2007). In 
Peninsular Malaysia, large-scale deforestation for commercial plantation agriculture began in 
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the early 20th century especially with the introduction of rubber (Jomo, Chang & Khoo, 2004). 
For the states of Sabah and Sarawak, the plantation boom only occurred in the 1980s and 
majority of the indigenous communities living in Sabah and Sarawak are still dependent on 
forests for subsistence based hunting and gathering and shifting cultivation (Jomo et al., 2004). 
Federal and state governments generally oppose shifting cultivation, perceiving it as wasteful 
and instead are very supportive of large-scale land development schemes (Jomo et al., 2004) 
According to FAO (2007), 63.6% of Malaysia is still covered by forest and this has often been 
used by the government and the industry as a defense for oil palm cultivation. However, this 
figure has been a subject of contention among NGOs. FAO s broad definition of forests 
actually includes forest plantations such as rubber plantations. The inclusion of forest 
plantations such as rubber (there is a fear that oil palm plantations may one day be included as 
forest plantations too) actually obscures the amount of natural forest that is actually left 
(WWF, 2008).           
Figure 3-2: Change in cultivated land area of the major tree crops in Malaysia from 1990 
 
2006 (Source: 
MPOC 2007)       
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Table 3-1: Forest Cover Change in Malaysia from 1995  2005 (mil ha) 
Forest Cover Type 1995 2000 2005 
Permanent Reserved Forest 
(PRF) - Protected 
3.43 3.84 3.11 
PRF  Sustainable Forest 
Management 
10.85 10.60 12.19 
National Parks, Wildlife and Bird 
Sanctuaries and Nature Reserves 
- Protected 
2.12 1.87 2.44 
State Land/Alienated Land 
 
Conversion Forest 
4.19 3.93 0.57 
i) Deforestation occurred mainly on state land that was alienated for development 
ii) Changes in hectarage of PRFs and National Parks, Wildlife & Bird Sanctuaries & Nature 
Reserves are due to reclassification 
Source: (FAO, 7th, 8th and 9th Malaysia Plans, Forestry Department of Malaysia, Ministry of 
Plantation Industries & Commodities, Tachibana, S., Rachagan S.S. and Thang, H.C.) - cited 
in Yusof, (2008) 
There is no legislation in Malaysia that holistically addresses biological diversity conservation 
and management (MNBP, 1998). Instead existing legislation are sectoral based. For example, 
the National Forestry Act 1984 deals only with management and use of forests, the Fisheries 
Act 1985 deals with fisheries and the protection of wildlife is dealt with separately in the 
Protection of Wild Life Act 1972 (MNBP, 1998). As such, the current legislative framework 
lacks comprehensive scope, coverage and consideration for biological diversity issues. 
Another deficiency is that legislative matters relevant to biodiversity does not always fall under 
one single authority. Some fall under both Federal and State authorities such as the protection 
of national parks and wildlife and others fall under the State legislative authority alone such as 
forests, land, water resources and agriculture (MNBP, 1998). There is also a lack of uniformity 
in state enactments especially concerning matters that are under the State jurisdiction alone 
such as native peoples' rights, forestry and protected areas (MNBP, 1998). 
3.2 The case of Sabah 
3.2.1 Geography, people, culture and economy 
Covering an area of 7.37 million hectares, Sabah is the second largest state among the thirteen 
states in Malaysia and is located at the northern tip of Borneo Island. The rainforests of Sabah 
is incredibly rich in biodiversity and is home to over 3,000 species of native trees and a variety 
of well known (and threatened) large mammals such as the orangutan, Borneon pygmy 
elephant, Sumatran rhino and proboscis monkey. Sabah has a population of 2.5 million where 
slightly over half is made up of 39 different indigenous communities (Lasimbang, 2002). 
Majority of the indigenous people live in rural areas where they depend on subsistence 
farming and cultivation of cash crops (PACOS, 2008). Over the years there have been issues 
with disputes over land ownership rights due to weak enforcement of the Native Customary 
Rights law and the indigenous communities of Sabah are still quite marginalized and lack 
behind in both social and economic terms (PACOS, 2008; Thien, 2008). In recent statistical 
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report compiled by UNDP showed that majority of Sabah s population is employed in the 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and manufacturing sectors (Leete, 2008). Despite rich timber 
resources and a growing tourism industry, the poverty rate in Sabah is the highest in the 
country with 23 percent of households (average 4-5 persons) living below the poverty line 
(Leete, 2008).  
3.2.2 Land use patterns and ownership 
According Toh & Grace (2006), there are three types of property rights in Sabah. 
1. State property rights 
 
covers all land that belongs to the State including forest 
reserves. 
2. Private property rights covers land that has been set aside by the state for 
development such as privately owned oil palm plantations 
3. Communal property rights covers land claimed by indigenous communities. 
Currently, only a small area is classified under this type 
Large scale logging began in Sabah in the 1950s and reached its peak in the 1970s and early 
1980s so much so that timber royalties made up almost 90 percent of the state s budget (Toh 
& Grace, 2006). Based on a study by Toh and Grace (2006), the substantial loss of forests in 
Sabah was mainly due to over harvesting, poor logging practices that lead to severe damage to 
residual trees, short logging cycles (no time for recuperation or regeneration) and the lack of 
silvicultural and rehabilitation activities following harvesting. This resulted in a massive 
reduction of primary forest cover, from 2.8 million hectares to 300,000 hectares while the area 
of degraded forest increased to 2.5 million hectares (1975 1995) (Mannan & Yahya, 1997 
cited in Toh & Grace, 2006).  
Over time, the rate of logging decreased as the forests became more degraded and high quality 
timber became less available. The forests faced a new threat in the form of oil palm 
plantations (Teoh, 2000; Teoh, 2002). Huge areas of degraded forests were degazetted and 
cleared for oil palm cultivation and by 2003, 87 percent of the total land under agricultural 
cultivation in Sabah was made up of oil palms (Toh & Grace, 2006). 
3.2.3 Yayasan Sabah and the Yayasan Sabah Forest Management 
Area (YSFMA) 
Yayasan Sabah (Sabah Foundation) is a statutory body that was established in 1966 by an 
enactment of the Sabah Legislative Assembly (Yayasan Sabah, 2008). The main aim of the 
institution is to improve the socio-economic situation in Sabah and to provide economic 
equity by improving the state s education, welfare and industry (Yayasan Sabah, 2008). The 
main source of funding was timber (initially) and Yayasan Sabah (YS) was allocated a forest 
concession area under a 100 year licence in south-eastern Sabah covering a total area of over 1 
million hectares (Yayasan Sabah, 2008). One of the largest forest concessions in Southeast 
Asia, the Yayasan Sabah Forest Management Area (YSFMA)2 takes up almost 14% of the 
state s land area and is managed by Innoprise Corporation Sdn. Bhd. (ICSB), a wholly owned 
commercial subsidiary of Yayasan Sabah (Yayasan Sabah, 2008). Today, ICSB has 38 
subsidiary companies and the YS Group s business activities have expanded to include real 
                                                
2
 YSFMA is also commonly referred to as YS concession area in other literature 
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estate, tourism, agro-plantation, fisheries, biotechnology and oil and gas (Yayasan Sabah, 
2008).  
 
Figure 3-3: Location of Yayasan Sabah s Forest Management A rea  
Within the concession, 750,000 hectares are commercial forests that have been logged from 
the early 1970s, 60,000 hectares are forest plantations and the Yayasan Sabah Group is in the 
process of developing 80,000 hectares into oil palm plantations by 2010 (Yayasan Sabah, 
2008).  
The YS record is one of noble official socio-economic objectives mixed with poor 
management and some abuse of its vast forest concessions (Jomo et al., 2004). With 
politicians sitting in senior management, it is not difficult for YS to obtain government 
approval to intensify timber harvest (Jomo et al., 2004). The way in which Yayasan Sabah (YS) 
manages its concession area has come under heavy criticism. The Chief Minister of Sabah 
(head of state cabinet), is also the Chairman of Yayasan Sabah and this has lead to questions 
regarding transparency in the awarding of logging and development contracts within the 
concession area (Daily Express, 2007b; Malaysiakini, 2007). The Malaysian branch of Friends 
of the Earth (Sahabat Alam Malaysia) has accused Innoprise Corporation Sdn. Bhd. of 
proceeding with the logging of 33,000 hectares of forests within the YSFMA (with the consent 
of a former Chief Minister) without ever conducting an EIA (Mohd. Idris 2000). Yayasan 
Sabah has also been accused of poor logging and management practices leading to incidences 
of illegal logging and severe degradation of the Ulu Segama-Malua Forest Reserve (pers. 
Comm. April 2007; Daily Express, 2007b). 
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Figure 3-4: The different management zones within the concession area. Source: SEARRP (2008) 
This is not to say that all of the YSFMA are designated for timber harvesting. Due to the high 
conservation value of certain areas, YS has set aside some areas under Class I Protection 
Forest. These include the Danum Valley, Maliau Basin and Imbak Canyon Conservation Areas 
(see Figure 3-4).  
The degraded state of much of the forests in the YSFMA and the subsequent decline in good 
quality timber harvest has lead to the development of several reforestation projects mostly 
with foreign funding and expertise. These include the first voluntary carbon offset initiatives 
in Malaysia, INFAPRO and RIL (see Box 3-1 and Box 3-2 for more details). INIKEA is a 
collaborative effort between "Sow a Seed", a Swedish foundation sponsored by furniture giant, 
IKEA, and ICSB. The forest rehabilitation project is supervised by the Swedish University of 
Agriculture Sciences and the funding comes from Sow a Seed . The site if INIKEA covering 
4,000 5,000 hectares was heavily degraded by a combination of bad logging practices and 
forest fires (Garcia & Falck, 2003).  
The latest initiatives to prevent further degradation and facilitate rehabilitation of the forests 
within the YSFMA were the declaration of the USM Forest Reserve under SFM and the 
introduction of the Malua bank project. 
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Box 3-1: Innoprise-FACE Foundation Rainforest Rehabilitation Project (INFAPRO) 
INFAPRO is a joint venture initiated in 1992 between Innoprise Corporation Sdn. Bhd. 
(the investment arm of Sabah Foundation) and the FACE (Forests Absorbing Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions) Foundation. FACE Foundation was set up in 1990 by the Dutch 
Electricity Generating Board with the aim of offsetting CO2 emissions by Dutch energy 
companies via reforestation. It was the first pilot carbon offset project to take off in 
Malaysia. The project is located within the YS Concession Area in the Ulu Segama Forest 
Reserve, near Danum Valley.  
 
Figure 3-5: Location of INFAPRO project 
The agreed project duration is 99 years, during which, 25,000 hectares of degraded mixed 
dipterocarp forests is to be rehabilitated with native species. No logging is allowed during 
the project period. The project is expected to yield an estimated offset of 2.3 million tonnes 
of carbon. About 11,000 hectares have been reforested as of December 2006.  
All project activities are based on a 10 year Management Plan and are overseen by a 
Steering Committee comprising the Sabah Forestry Department (SFD), Sabah Foundation 
and University Putra Malaysia and Forest Research Institute Malaysia (FRIM). 
Rehabilitation activities consist of enrichment planting and silviculture (removal of climbers 
and shrubs to promote optimum growth of dipterocarps).  
Without external intervention, the degraded forest would never return to its natural state. 
Furthermore, there were insufficient local funds for the rehabilitation. The INFAPRO 
carbon offset project offered the perfect solution as revenue generated for the carbon 
credits can be used for further restoration efforts. Besides carbon sequestration, the project 
also contributes to biodiversity conservation by improving the habitat for wildlife. 
Source: SFD (2006), and Climate Neutral Group (2008)  
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3.2.4 Forest policy and Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) 
There are seven types of forest reserves depending on their use. There are 3,595,216 hectares 
of forest reserves in Sabah (48.8 percent of the total land area) and most of them fall under 
the control of the Sabah Forestry Department (SFD) (Refer to Table 3-2).            
Box 3-2: Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) Project 
In 1992, Rakyat Berjaya Sdn. Bhd., subsidiary of Yayasan Sabah, entered into a joint venture 
with New England Power Company of Massachusetts, USA, to develop a pilot carbon 
offset project using RIL techniques. A total of 1400 hectares of forest was harvested using 
RIL methods resulting in an estimated CO2 offset of 400,000 to 500,000 tonnes over a 
period of 60 years. RIL techniques have been shown to significantly reduce soil disturbance 
and damages to residual trees. Compared to conventional logging, RIL reduces 
environmental damages by 50 percent.   
To ensure compliance, an Environmental Audit Committee consisting of representatives 
from the Rainforest Alliance, Forest Research Institute Malaysia (FRIM), University of 
Florida and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), conducts independent 
verification based on FSC guidelines.  
Since New England Company pays for the sequestered carbon that comes from the use of 
RIL techniques, Rakyat Berjaya is compensated for the extra costs associated with the 
adoption of RIL and is thus able to with cheaper logs in the market harvested by 
conventional methods. The implementation of RIL by logging companies may not be as 
financially feasible otherwise. 
Source:: Waidi, Yap, & Jaludin (2007),
 
Dykstra (1996) and Dykstra & Heinrich (1997).
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Table 3-2: Permanent Forest Estate in Sabah. Source: SFD (2006) 
Type Use Area 
(hectares) 
Percentage 
Class I       
Protection Forest 
Forest set aside for ecosystem services 
such as soil protection, water catchment 
and biodiversity conservation. 
342,848 9.5 
Class II      
Commercial Forest
 
Forest set aside for logging to supply 
timber and other forest products.  
2,683,480 74.6 
Class III     
Domestic Forest 
Forest gazetted for local communities to 
hunt, fish and collect minor forest 
products for their own domestic use, 
subject to permits. 
7,355 0.2 
Class IV     
Amenity Forest 
Provide recreational opportunities for the 
general public. Recreational facilities may 
be provided and exotic tree species are 
often planted to increase the recreation 
value of these forests. 
21,092 0.6 
Class V      
Mangrove Forest 
Forest for supplying mangrove timber and 
other produce (such as firewood and 
fishing stakes) to meet general trade 
demands 
315,874 8.8 
Class VI     
Virgin Jungle 
Forest that are set aside for research 
purposes and logging is strictly prohibited. 
91,914 2.6 
Class VII    
Wildlife Reserve 
Forest conserved for wildlife protection 
and research. These forests are managed 
by the Sabah Wildlife Department 
132,653 3.7 
Total 3,595,216 100 
For operational and administrative convenience, forest lands in Sabah are divided into 27 
forest management units (FMUs) averaging 100,000 hectares in area (Toh & Grace, 2006). In 
September 1997, Sustainable Forest Management License Agreement (SFMLA) replaced the 
licenses previously issued for commercial timber harvesting they are valid for 100 years (Toh 
& Grace, 2006). The Sustainable Forest Management model was based on the Deramakot 
project (see Box 3-3). 
Under the SFMLA, the licensee is required to post a MYR 5 million performance guarantee 
bond to ensure compliance to licensing conditions that contain requirements on management,  
silviculture, rehabilitation and use of reduced-impact logging (RIL) techniques (Toh & Grace, 
2006). Companies that do not comply risk losing their bonds and having their licenses revoked 
by SFD (Toh & Grace, 2006).  
Forests on state land that have not been gazetted as a forest reserve are not protected in any 
way and therefore the state reserves the right to alienate such lands for development and these 
are the forests that are usually logged and cleared for agriculture (Toh & Grace, 2006).   
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3.3 Malaysia and Oil Palm 
3.3.1 History and Development 
The oil palm tree (Elaeis guineensis) is West African in origin and was first introduced by British 
colonizers to Malaysia (then Malaya) in the early 1870s as an ornamental plant (MPOC, 2007). 
The first commercial planting took place in 1917 in the state of Selangor and the tree has since 
flourished and established itself as the number one plantation crop in Malaysia (MPOC, 2007). 
In 1920, there was only 100 hectares of land covered in oil palm and this steadily grew to 
around 55,000 hectares in 1960 (Gustaffson, 2007). Cultivation was intensified in the sixties as 
part of the government s agricultural diversification programme to reduce the country s 
economic dependence on rubber and tin and to alleviate rural poverty (MPOC, 2007).  
Box 3-3: Deramakot Forest Reserve 
In 1989, SFD with technical support from the German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) began development of a pilot project with the aim of making it a 
sustainable forest management (SFM) model for the rest of Sabah. The success of the 
project eventually led to the establishment of the long-term Sustainable Forest 
Management License Agreement policy launched in September 1997.  
The Deramakot Forest Reserve was basically 55,000 hectares of logged over forest. The 
area was licensed for logging from 1955 to 1989. Felling cycle was supposed to be 60 
years and the minimum diameter for harvesting was 60cm. However, these conditions 
were ignored and this resulted in severe degradation in more than 30 percent of the 
forest. Only a mere 20 percent of the area had considerable stock of trees that are suitable 
for harvesting when the SFM project was initiated. 
About three-quarters of Deramakot Forest Reserve remain undisturbed at any given time. 
This means that all forest management activities such as harvesting, silviculture and 
replanting are focused on a small area of about 10,000 hectares staggered over a 10 year 
period. The intention is to provide an undisturbed habitat for wildlife as well as promote 
natural plant succession in the reserve. The Deramakot forest is an important habitat for 
globally threatened animals such as the orang utan, Asian elephant, banteng (wild cattle), 
proboscis monkey, and clouded leopard 
The Deramakot project also helped improve the livelihood of native communities living 
within its fringes by providing employment (there are no indigenous people living in the 
reserve itself) in carrying out management activities. These communities traditionally 
depend on subsistence cultivation, fishing and collection of non-timber forest products.  
In 1997, the Deramakot Forest Reserve became the first natural forest reserve in 
Southeast Asia to be certified as well managed by FSC. Early 2008, the Deramakot 
project received a boost in funding from HSBC Malaysia to support further reforestation 
activities to improve the well being of orang utans living in the reserve. 
(Source: Mannan, Yahya, Radin, Abi & Lagan, 2002; Lagan, Mannan & Matsubayashi, 2007).  
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The Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) was established in 1956 with the support 
of World Bank and United Nations (FELDA, 2008; Gustaffson, 2007). It is part of a poverty 
reduction scheme for landless farmers and smallholders. FELDA has enabled the resettlement 
of about 100,000 families who were landless and living below the poverty level and provided 
each family with 4 hectares of land cultivated with crops such as oil palm, rubber or cocoa 
(Gustaffson, 2007). Through this land scheme, FELDA currently manages 853,313 hectares of 
plantations and provides basic amenities such as piped water, electricity, schools, roads and 
medical facilities to the employed farmers (FELDA, 2008). 
By 2002, land area covered by oil palm plantations was about 67 times what it was in 1960 
(Ramli, 2003). Initially, most of this expansion took place in the Malaysian peninsula but as the 
availability of cheap and suitable land ran out, more of the recent expansions took place in 
West Malaysia (Borneo island) in the States of Sabah and Sarawak (Teoh, 2000; Teoh 2002). 
Although commercial planting only began around 1970 in Sabah, by 1999, oil palm plantations 
cover over 28 percent of the state s total land area. 
 
Figure 3-6: Increase in oil palm planted area in Malaysia from 1975  2006. (Source: MPOB, 2006) 
Malaysia is the largest exporter of palm oil in the world and in 2006, 15.9 million tonnes of 
palm oil was produced from plantations covering an area of 4.17 million hectares and 
contributing about USD 9.7 billion in export earnings (MPOC, 2007). The industry employs 
more than half a million people. Sabah is the biggest palm oil producing state in Malaysia 
accounting for over 30 percent of national output and has over 1.2 million hectares of palm 
oil plantation (POIC, 2007).  
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Figure 3-7: Distribution of the Malaysian Oil Palm Business in 2006. (Source: MPOC, 2007) 
Table 3-3: Area under oil palm relative to total land area (2007).  
Location Land area (mil ha) Oil palm area (mil ha) % of area under oil palm 
Peninsula Malaysia 
Sarawak 
Sabah 
Malaysia 
13.16 
12.33 
7.37 
32.86 
2.36 
0.66 
1.28 
4.3 
17.9 
5.4 
17.4 
13.1 
(Source: MPOC, 2007) 
Despite negative publicity and strong pressure from green NGOs, the global use of palm oil 
continues to grow due to its relatively low price and its wide variety of uses, such as cooking 
oil, cosmetic, food additives, industrial lubricants and more recently biofuel (MPOC, 2007). 
The competitiveness of plantation palm oil production relies on cheap labour and land. 
Tapping on the potentially large and emerging global biofuel market, Malaysia is looking to 
further expand and develop its palm oil industry. By 2020 the projected oil palm coverage is 
4.9 million hectares, with slightly more than half being in the states of Sabah and Sarawak 
(Ramli, 2003). Faced with the limitation of land for expansion of plantations the Malaysian 
palm oil industry is placing more emphasis on technological improvements to improve the 
yield per hectare of land (Teoh, 2002). 
3.3.2 The Controversial Palm 
Despite accusations that oil palm cultivation is the main driver of deforestation and habitat 
loss from organizations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, spokespersons for the 
Malaysian palm oil industry remained defensive on the negative claims associated with palm oil 
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cultivation. A quick look at the website of the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC) revealed 
many reports and press releases highlighting the environment virtues of the oil palm tree 
contrary to allegations by green NGOs. One article even went as far as to say that oil palm 
plantations should be likened to planted forests as the oil palm is after all a forest species 
(Yusof 2007a). The industry is also quick to point out that in comparison to other crops 
grown for oil production, the oil palm is by far the most efficient crop giving the highest yield 
per hectare (see Table 1) (Yusof 2007a) 
Table 3-4: Productivity of oil palm in comparison with the other plant based oils 
Oil Crop Oil production 
(million tonnes) 
Average oil yield 
(tonnes/ha/yr) 
Planted area 
(million ha) 
Soybean 33.58 0.36 92.10 
Sunflower 9.66 0.42 22.90 
Rapeseed 16.21 0.59 27.30 
Oil palm 33.73 3.68 9.17 
Source: Oil World Dec 2007 cited in Yusof (2008) 
An oil palm tree will normally start bearing fruits after 30 months of planting and will 
continue to be productive for the next 20 to 30 years (Ramli 2003). The productivity is also 
reflected in high photosynthetic rates resulting in oxygen emission and carbon dioxide 
absorption rates that are ten times more effective than those observed for soybean (Yusof 
2007). 
3.3.3 Greening of the Industry 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was set up in 2003 and is made up of a 
myriad of stakeholders including plantation companies, environmental and social NGOs, 
biofuel companies and manufacturers and retailers of palm oil products. The main aim of 
RSPO is to promote the development and use of sustainable palm oil by engaging all 
stakeholders and participants along the palm oil supply chain. Its latest and much publicized 
initiative is the introduction of a RSPO certification scheme for sustainable palm oil (Benjamin 
2007, Murray 2007).  
The Malaysian Palm Oil Council recently organized an International Palm Oil Sustainability 
Conference (IPOSC) in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. The three day conference held in April 2008 
which featured speakers from environmental NGOs, the academia, palm oil corporations and 
associations, attracted more than 500 local and foreign participants. The conference also saw 
the launch of the Malaysian Palm Oil Wildlife Conservation Fund of RM20 million (USD6.4 
million) whereby half of the fund is made up of contributions from Malaysian palm oil 
companies and the balance is a grant from the government. The purpose of the fund is to 
finance research on wildlife, oil palm and the environment.  
The state of Sabah has recently announced its intention to set up a Wildlife Habitat 
Conservation Bank to sell biodiversity credits to generate funds for the conservation of the 
Malua Forest Reserve (Muguntan 2007, The Star 2007b) which is said to harbour about 3000 
orang utans (The Star 2007a). As the main targets to purchase these credits are palm oil 
businesses (Muguntan 2007, The Star 2007b), it can be seen as a move to make the industry 
more sustainable. 
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4 Conservation Banking in Malua, Sabah 
This chapter provides an overview of the bank set up based on initial press releases and 
information obtained from interviews conducted with those directly involved in the project 
negotiations. A brief background as to the location of the bank, the Malua Forest Reserve and 
its surrounding as well as an introduction to the conservation plans (present and future) that 
SFD has set in motion are also given. This is to build a better understanding of the current 
developments in Sabah and the priorities of the state with regards to forestry and 
conservation.  
4.1 Basic setup 
In November 2007, the Sabah state government announced its intention to enter into a joint 
venture with New Forests Pty. Ltd. to set a Wildlife Habitat Conservation Bank at the Malua 
Forest Reserve covering 34,000 hectares (The Star, 2007b). An MoU (memorandum of 
understanding) was signed between New Forests and Sabah Foundation, under which both 
parties agreed to carry out a detailed feasibility study, business plan and marketing plan for the 
commercial operation of the bank (New Forests, 2007). New Forests is an Australian based 
forestry investment management and consultancy business, specializing in environmental 
markets (New Forests, 2007). 
New Forests will invest an estimated USD 10 million to fund the rehabilitation and protection 
of the Malua reserve in return for the rights to market and sell the biodiversity credits 
generated by the conservation banking scheme (Mahabir, 2007). The ownership of Malua will 
be retained by the government (Mahabir, 2007). Modelled after the U.S. endangered species 
banking (New Forests, 2007), this conservation initiative is a first for Malaysia and the 
Southeast Asian region as a whole.  
According to press releases by both the Malaysian media and New Forests, the credits are 
targeted towards the palm oil and energy sector in order to strengthen their environmental 
portfolio (Kaur, 2008; The Star, 2007b; Daily Express, 2007a). Sabah Chief Minister, Datuk 
Seri Musa Aman, called on all sectors, including the oil palm and oil and gas industries, to 
consider the purchase of these credits (The Star, 2007b; Daily Express, 2007a). Although the 
purchase of biodiversity credits is not a regulatory requirement, Datuk Sam Mannan, Director 
of Sabah Forestry Department mentioned the possibility of imposing the requirement in 
contracts with oil palm companies when new areas are converted to plantations (The Star, 
2007b). 
According to Dr. David Brand, Managing Director of New Forests, the main aim of the bank 
is to create a win-win solution for all parties (Kaur, 2008). Not only will the scheme enable 
palm oil companies to contribute to forest protection and generate returns on private 
investments, but it can also potentially contribute to improving the sustainability of oil palm 
cultivation (New Forests, 2007). 
Based on information in articles printed in national dailies, press releases on the New Forests 
website (www.newforests.com.au) and personal communication with local NGOs, the key 
actors in the setting up of the Malua Wildlife Conservation Bank have been identified as Sabah 
Forestry Department, New Forests, LEAP3 and Yayasan Sabah. Malua was chosen due to a 
                                                
 
3
 LEAP (Land Empowerment Animals People) is an NGO that is working with forest and wildlife conservation issues as well 
as indigenous community development in Sabah. LEAP was involved in facilitating the development of the Malua Wildlife 
Nature For Sale But Whos Buying?  
37 
combination of factors, the presence of high orang utan population and other flagship4 
species, the size and location (serves as a wildlife corridor for the greater USM area and 
DVCA)5.  
Like much of the USM area, certain sections of the Malua Forest Reserve are severely 
degraded due to logging activities which means the main activities of the bank would involve 
rehabilitation and reforestation works. The orang utan population in USM is said to be 
stressed at a density of 6.6 individuals per square kilometre (sq km) as there is not enough 
healthy forest areas for them to spread out.6 A healthy population should have a density of 
about 2.5 individuals per sq km. As mentioned earlier, New Forests will put in an initial 
investment of USD 10 million in exchange for the right to market and sell the credits (called 
BioD credits). New Forests is currently developing a Conservation Management Plan (CMP) 
which will be submitted to the Malua project management committee (comprising of SFD, 
Sabah Wildlife Department, NGOs and Yayasan Sabah) for approval.  
At the moment, one hectare of land will be worth 100 credits with a minimum price of 7 USD 
per credit7. The proceeds from the sale of credits will go into a trust fund. The money will be 
split three ways8, a portion will go to the State, a portion will go to New Forests and the 
remainder will be used to finance the activities stipulated in the (CMP). YS is the contracting 
party on behalf of the Sabah state government (the project is taking place within its 
concession area). YS will be responsible in ensuring that the CMP is implemented properly 
under the guidance and direct control of SFD.  
The contract period for the project is still under discussion but SFD is looking at a timeline of 
maybe 50 years subject to the performance of the bank. The CMP however is only for a 10 
year period (it will be subjected to renewal every 10 years). The purchase of credits is purely 
voluntary and the project management committee is hoping to attract both international and 
local buyers. Contrary to what was announced in the initial press releases, Fredrick Kugan 
from SFD says that their main target is not necessarily the palm oil industry and the energy 
sector but any organizations (commercial or otherwise) that would be keen to invest in 
biodiversity conservation. He also added that support from the local palm oil industry would 
also be desirable. At the moment, there are no plans to impose a regulatory requirement on 
the purchase of BioD credits similar to the conservation banking model in the U.S. 
The Malua Forest Reserve official classification is still Class II Production Forest (for now), 
although some areas will be designated for conservation. Reclassification of the reserve is a 
future possibility but much of it depends on the success of the bank based on the sale of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
Conservation Bank project and was a key mediator in the negotiations between New Forests and Sabah Forestry 
Department (personal comm., Cynthia Ong, April 2008).   
4 Flagship species - popular, charismatic species that serve as symbols and rallying points to stimulate conservation awareness 
and action. http://biodiversitychm.eea.europa.eu/nyglossary_terms/F/flagship_species 
5
 Cynthia Ong personal communication May 2008 
6 Fredrick Kugan, personal communication April 2008 
7 Fredrick Kugan, personal communication April 2008 
8 At the time of study, information on the actual proportion of the division of the fund could not be obtained. 
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credits and the implementation of the first CMP. According to SFD, Malua is zoned for 
conservation9 which means there will be no timber harvesting for at least 50 years. 
The Malua project is still under negotiation although all parties hope to finalise and sign an 
agreement in June.  
4.2 The Ulu Segama-Malua Forest Reserve 
The proposed bank site, Malua Forest Reserve, is a small part of a greater area known as the 
Ulu Segama-Malua Forest Reserve (USM). Covering over 241,098 hectares, USM is said to 
house the highest concentration of orang utans in Northern Borneo, an estimated 3,300 
individuals (SFD, 2006). The area is also home to other significant (and threatened) wildlife 
such as the elusive Sumatran Rhino, Borneon pygmy elephant, Malayan sun bear and 
Tembadau (wild cattle) (SFD, 2006). USM also plays an important role as a buffer or 
wildlife corridor for the highly protected Danum Valley Conservation Area (DVCA), the 
largest and most pristine lowland Dipterocarp forest in Sabah (43,800 hectares) (SFD, 2006) 
 
Figure 4-1: Location of Malua Forest Reserve. Source: WWF-Sabah, email attachment, May  2008  
In a press release, the Sam Mannan, Forestry Director admitted that USM was a logging 
disaster but the state has no choice but to allow the logging to continue according to license 
conditions (Daily Express, 2007a). Due to its importance for biodiversity conservation, on 
15th March 2006, the Sabah state government declared the USM Forest Reserve to be placed 
under Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) based on the successful pioneer model of the 
Deramakot Forest Reserve. When the declaration was made the Ulu Segama and Malua forest 
reserves were still heavily logged and logging was only phased out by 31st Dec 2007 (SFD, 
                                                
9 A protection category within production forest reserves (Fredrick Kugan, Pers. Comm., April 2008) 
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2006). A condition was placed on Malua to prepare Comprehensive Harvesting Plans (CHPs) 
and implement Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) from the period of the declaration for SFM till 
logging is phased out (SFD, 2006). Commercial timber harvesting in the reserve began in the 
early 1960s (Mannan, 2007).  
Table 4-1: The USM Project Area.  
Forest Reserves Class Function Area (hectares) 
Danum Valley 
Ulu Segama Malua 
Merisuli 
Kawag Gibong 
Sepagaya  
I 
II 
VI 
VI 
VI 
I 
Protection 
Production 
Virgin Jungle Reserve 
Virgin Jungle Reserve 
Virgin Jungle Reserve 
Protection 
43,800 
236,825 
552 
707 
2,316 
698 
*Danum Valley is managed separately by Danum Valley Management Committee (DVMC) 
(Source: SFD 2006) 
According to SFD s 2006 annual report the main aim of declaring the USM Forest Reserves 
under SFM was to secure a home for orang utans in co-existence with forest management in 
the long term . A Forest Management Plan was drawn up by the Forest Management 
Planning Team (FMPT) consisting of representatives from SFD, YS, Sabah Wildlife 
Department, WWF and other NGOs (SFD, 2006).  
Table 4-2: Preliminary Zoning of Forest Functions in USM 
Zone Area (hectares) Percentage (%) 
Protection 
Conservation 
Production 
50,161 
53,349 
181,388 
17.6 
18.7 
63.7 
Total 284,898 100 
(Source: SFD 2006) 
The USM is classified as production forests and much of it is said to be in a highly degraded 
condition. Forests in the northern part of Ulu Segama for example, had been logged in 1960s 
by concessionaires and short term licensees in the 1970s and 1980s (Mannan, 2007). The 
severe degradation of some 12,000 hectares was caused by a combination of unsustainable 
logging practices, forest fires and illegal encroachment and cultivation by illegal immigrants 
(Mannan, 2007). 
As an indication to the severity of the problem, 4,000 hectares have been identified for 
immediate silviculture treatment and 160,977 hectares was recommended for restoration10 
(SFD, 2006). All in all, the project will cost the state over half a billion ringgit in investments 
                                                
 
10 Restoration was recommended on areas that have less than 10 trees of 40 cm dbh and above per hectare and areas that are 
devoid of forest cover (illegally cleared or planted with oil palm and other crops). Restoration methods will be based on 
the INFAPRO project. 
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and about one billion ringgit of forgone revenue (SFD, 2006). This has led SFD to explore 
new sources of funding including the possibility of carbon offset projects under the voluntary 
market or CDM (SFD, 2006). About 2,570 hectares of forest which were degraded due to fires 
in 1983 may offer a viable option for a CDM project under Kyoto Protocol (SFD, 2006). 
4.3 Sabah Development Corridor 
In January 2008, the Malaysian Prime Minister launched the ambitious Sabah Development 
Corridor (SDC). The SDC is projected to bring about a total of RM105 billion (USD 33 
billion) in investments, 900,000 jobs, a waterfront city, tourism projects and an expansion in 
agro-food industry, agro-forestry and palm oil based industry over the next 18 years (Vanar & 
Sario, 2008). With the demand of palm oil outstripping supply and the rising prices of CPO, 
further expansion of oil palm plantations is expected in Sabah and Sarawak as suitable land in 
the Peninsula is no longer available (Teoh, 2000; Teoh, 2002; Sario, 2008). Malaysia s first 
Palm Oil Industrial Cluster (POIC) was set up two years ago in Sabah to further develop the 
state s palm oil sector and is projected to attract investments worth about  RM9 billion (USD 
2.8 billion) and will be further developed as part of the SDC project (Sario, 2008). As part of 
Sabah s POIC master plan (2006-2021), there are huge plans in place to promote the 
development of downstream processing of palm oil especially in relation to biodiesel 
production as well as major jetty development to ease import and export activities (Hanim, 
2008).   
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5 Stakeholder Perspectives 
While examining the various stakeholder perspectives, it should be taken into account that the 
interviewees do not have in depth experience or knowledge on biodiversity offset scheme and 
PES mechanisms. Their views and perspectives are based on information that is made 
available to them through the course of their work in their respective organizations. However, 
for the purpose of this study, this is not seen as a limitation because in reality, aside from the 
actors involved in the design of the trading scheme itself, the rest of the stakeholder groups 
(government, NGOs, target buyers 
 
developers, industry players) would have limited and 
varying expertise in the field. This is especially true for Malaysian stakeholders as the idea of 
PES is still relatively new. 
5.1 Government 
SFD recognises the need to restore the degraded forests in Sabah. The state is also all too 
aware of the high cost this requires and is open to the introduction of new mechanisms to 
fund rehabilitation efforts. Whether or not the state will continue to support similar 
conservation schemes hinges on the success of this project but they seem optimistic for now. 
SFD for now is more supportive of voluntary trading markets compared to CDM projects for 
carbon sequestration due to the various eligibility issues11. Forest based CDM projects require 
that the land in question is not a forest at the start of the project and that either afforestation 
or reforestation activities have to be undertaken (FRIM 2007). As such the choice of national 
forest definition is important as it determines the eligibility of the land for CDM. So far no 
threshold definition of a forest has been submitted and as such no A&R (afforestation and 
reforestation) CDM projects have been registered (Theseira 2007). Consequently, voluntary 
offset markets similar to the INFAPRO project seem more attractive at the moment (Theseira 
2007, Fredrick Kugan, pers comm., April 2008) 
Malaysia has indicated strong interest and support in the REDD mechanism (Fletcher et al. 
2007) but also wishes to include a compensation for SFM practices in addition to incentives 
totally protected areas (Samsudin, Fletcher & Norini, 2007). There is also developing interest 
in using conservation easements as a tool to protect increasingly fragmented natural habitats 
within private lands (e.g. oil palm estates) especially river reserves12. Although already practised 
in the U.S. where tax incentives are given to participating landowners, the idea remains under 
developed in Malaysia and feasibility studies still need to be conducted13.  
5.2 Palm oil businesses (Upstream producers) 
Two major oil palm plantation companies were included in this study. For the sake of 
anonymity, they shall be referred to as Company A and Company B. Both interviewees were 
from senior management level and from departments that oversee environment and quality 
issues. Both companies have been very active in conservation activities in Sabah. Company A 
has oil palm plantations in both Malaysia and Indonesia covering an area of 524,626 hectares. 
                                                
11 Fredrick Kugan, personal communication, April 2008 
12 Sivanathan Elagupillay, personal communication, May 2008 
13 Sivanathan Elagupillay, personal communication, May 2008 
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Company B has 167,875 hectares of oil palm plantations in Malaysia of which almost 70 
percent are in Sabah. Both companies are members of RSPO. 
Both interviewees responded positively to the Malua banking project and indicated that 
investment in the biodiversity banking scheme is something they would look into once they 
obtain more information regarding the project. Aside from news releases, industrial 
representatives are not aware of the details of the banking scheme. Both respondents agree 
that there is substantial pressure from international buyers to ensure the sustainability of palm 
oil production due to the negative publicity brought on by governments and NGOs like 
Greenpeace. As such the industry is eager to be a part of the conservation projects in Malaysia 
provided they are economically viable and result in genuine benefits to the environment. 
However, there was a perception that the debate over the sustainability of palm oil is highly 
politicised and is used to by EU countries and the U.S. to protect their own agriculture 
industry.  
While respondent from Company A felt that there will still be interests in the credits despite 
the voluntary nature of the scheme, respondent from Company B was (at least from his side) 
less optimistic. He felt that for the industry to actively participate in the credit trading scheme, 
purchase of credits should be made a regulatory obligation (similar to the US model) 
otherwise, most industrial players will employ a wait and see attitude. He also added that 
this was also influenced by Malaysian culture, voluntary schemes just don t work in 
Malaysia . He also added that regulation will result in some sort of uniformity to the system, 
meaning that all palm oil companies will be required to buy credits, placing them on a level 
playing field. He also stressed that in order to capture the interest of buyers, it is crucial to 
have an independent third party verification to ensure transparency and accountability 
especially pertaining to fund management. It was indicated that there will be more trust in the 
scheme if there was high involvement from environmental NGO s in the development and 
monitoring process. 
From the interviews, it was indicated that companies would be more willing to purchase these 
credits if it makes good business sense to do so. Both interviewees felt that at the moment, the 
main priority for oil palm plantation companies in Malaysia is to obtain RSPO certification to 
enable the competitiveness of their product in international markets.  
5.3 Investors/Customers 
Since the concept of biodiversity banking is still rather new and very little details regarding the 
Malua banking scheme is known aside from the press releases.  It was difficult for 
stakeholders in this group to properly comment on their positions on it. As mentioned in the 
previous section, local palm oil companies are generally open to the idea and view the 
introduction of the Malua banking project as a novel tool that could enhance current 
conservation initiatives but are adopting a "wait and see" approach at the moment pending 
more detailed feasibility plan. The same was more or less the case for the environmental 
manager of an oil refining and marketing company (Company C) based in Northern Europe. 
She also thinks that biodiversity banking could potentially be a good way to complement other 
sustainability initiatives within the palm oil sector. However a lot more information needs to 
be known before a stronger opinion can be made. Coincidentally, Company B is Company C s 
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sole supplier of palm oil from Malaysia. She is also in agreement with the local palm oil 
businesses that the main priority at the moment is the RSPO certification14. 
Based on statements and comments from interviewees representing investors, there appeared 
to be a lack of interest in a biodiversity trading scheme. This could be attributed to a lack of 
understanding more so than a lack of confidence in the idea. An investment analyst from 
Company D feels that it is very much dependent on the kind of commodity it refers to and 
how the offset would work and whether a balanced tradeoff is being made (Company D is a 
prominent insurance company and fund manager based in the UK). HSBC, the first major 
bank to become carbon neutral, has recently committed to fund reforestation activities at 
Deramakot. Although active in climate change issues, HSBC Malaysia has no immediate plans 
to move towards the purchasing or trading of biodiversity credits15.  
Furthermore, the analyst from Company D felt that a balanced trade off is rarely made in 
offset schemes and at the moment, the primary concern for energy and biofuel related 
companies is with the sourcing and purchasing of sustainable palm oil. She believes that 
companies main impact on the environment is through their own operations and that is 
where focus should be given when it comes to mitigation. 
5.4 Industry Organisations 
Vengeta Rao of RSPO is unsure if there will be sufficient demand for the credits as it will be 
seen as additional operational costs especially in Sabah where the sales tax on palm oil is the 
highest in Malaysia. Currently, RSPO certification is the priority among most palm oil 
producers and having to have both certification and purchase of biodiversity credits (if made 
regulatory) may be seen as burdensome. However, he added that the industry will always opt 
for whatever the market prefers. The palm oil producers will also consider the business aspect 
of the investment in BioD credits (i.e. will there be a healthy trading environment for these 
credits)16. Although supportive of the proposal, MPOA (Malaysian Palm Oil Association) also 
added that strong incentives such as tax exemptions, evident CSR benefits and the ability to 
offset development of HCV (high conservation value) areas would be needed to drive a 
demand for these credits17. HCV areas typically have ecological, cultural or economical 
significance in that they either have high biodiversity, perform an important environmental 
service (flood control, soil protection, etc.), meet subsistence needs of local communities and 
so forth (RSPO 2007). HCV areas in a plantation holding have to be properly managed with 
respect to RSPO criteria and in some cases new plantings may not be allowed in these areas 
(RSPO 2007). As such, plantation owners may see a benefit in investing in biodiversity credits 
as a form of compensation if they are able to go ahead and develop HCV areas within their 
                                                
 
14 Currently RSPO certified palm oil is still not yet available in the market. Information from interviews indicated that the 
certification is a very time consuming process and for larger companies, it may take up to 4-5 years before they are able to 
get all their plantations certified. However, some certified palm oil is expected to hit the market by the later part of this 
year or early next year.  
15 HSBC Malaysia s Head of Group Communications (M sia) and Corporate Sustainability, personal communication, April 
2008 
16 Vengeta Rao, personal communication, April 2008 
17 Head of R&D, personal communication, May 2008 
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estates in exchange. Aside from providing incentives, how transparency and accountability of 
the scheme are managed are also important factors18.  
5.5 Others 
Environmental groups appeared to be supportive of the scheme although aside from LEAP, 
the other groups interviewed had varying degrees of understanding about biodiversity banking 
and did not have much information specific to the Malua case aside from what was revealed in 
press releases. They seem to be unanimous in agreement that conservation banking is a useful 
way of generating funds for conservation projects that might otherwise not secure the 
necessary resources. Rahim of WWF Sabah said that a lot of time is spent sourcing for donors 
for conservation projects and the options are decreasing, trading schemes (whether carbon or 
biodiversity credits) may be the way to go.  
Judit Mayer19 was quick to add that biodiversity offsets do not and probably cannot provide 
equivalent environmental services especially when the trade off is made between a unique 
tropical rainforest and monoculture plantations such as large-scale oil palm estates. She is also 
concerned that companies will use these credits to market their products as green or 
environmentally sustainable when in fact the production phase involves the destruction or 
degradation of environmental resources. She also feels that environmental trading schemes are 
marketing and political tools with little basis in ecological reality as they may be used to 
support state policies and industries in projecting a greener image for their activities. Cynthia 
Ong from LEAP is aware of the possible green washing and license to trash that the 
scheme may promote but argues that they (the conservation movement) have to start engaging 
industries in a way that is real and collaborative and the Malua project could be a step in that 
direction, otherwise, it will just be business as usual . Judit agrees that if oil palm plantations 
are going to continue expanding anyway, then schemes like the Malua project can channel a 
portion of profits for ex situ conservation activities but emphasises that the loss of habitats 
and ecosystem services that are caused by large scale oil palm cultivation can never be fully 
compensated for at it would be a great fiction to assume otherwise. 
A technical expert from UNEP-GRASP20 thinks that financial mechanisms are important for 
sustainable forest management and the conservation of great apes. If successful, he feels that 
the Malua bank will provide an important model or case study for great ape conservation in 
other countries.  
Gabriel Chong raised concern of possible insecurity regarding the permanence of such 
schemes. Drawing from previous experience, he said that Wetlands International faced 
problems trying to qualify their mangrove rehabilitation projects in Sabah for VERs (voluntary 
emission rights). Apparently there was a lack of confidence in the permanence of the wetlands 
in questions as they belonged to the state and there was no guarantee that they would not be 
gazetted for development in the future. Nevertheless, Wetlands International is generally 
supportive of PES schemes and has recently entered into a partnership with Biox Group to 
                                                
 
18 Head of R&D, personal communication, May 2008 
19 Judit Mayer works with an environmental NGO that does conservation work in Borneo. However her comments are 
personal and based on her experience as an environmental planner and policy analyst and does not represents the 
organization she is affiliated with. 
20 The GRASP secretariat have been working with Malaysian government agencies and NGO s since 2003 on environment 
and conservation issues. 
Nature For Sale But Whos Buying?  
45 
launch a Global Peatland Fund to invest in the conservation and restoration of Indonesian 
peatlands while generating VERs for sale21. 
At the moment, because there are no indigenous communities living inside the Malua Forest 
Reserve, and consequently they are considered as a non-issue by most parties22. However, 
LEAP disagrees. Cynthia Ong feels that the rights and interests of those living in the periphery 
of the reserve should be considered. She adds that the state tends to view indigenous 
communities as a problem rather then a strong potential ally. She also stresses that LEAP is 
working to ensure that the rights of the communities living in the periphery of Malua and are 
somehow dependent on the reserve be considered (and remunerated) fairly in the CMP. She 
has the support of New Forests who recognises that the people element is an important part 
of the Malua project to make the credits acceptable to potential buyers23.  
Another thing of interest that came up is the application of SFM as a conservation tool for 
Sabah s remaining forest reserves. Both SFD and WWF are keen on using the SFM and FSC 
certification as a tool to conserve the remaining forest resources. While they are optimistic of 
the effectiveness of SFM due to the success of Deramakot, LEAP is less so. LEAP 
acknowledges that there is a lot of land that can be converted into palm oil at the moment and 
is resigned to the fact that only SFM can save the remaining forests of Sabah. That is the 
economic reality of the situation. Initial studies have shown that SFM practices are better 
than conventional logging in terms of carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and 
long term yield of high quality timber (Pearce, 2003, Mannan et al. 2002, Lagan et al. 2007). 
However, conventional logging is still more profitable in the short term as SFM comes at a 
high cost and with a long payback period. The Deramakot forest still requires external funding 
(Mannan et al. 2002, Chiew, 2008). As such, it is unlikely that most companies will go for it 
unless they are compensated in some way (Mannan et al. 2002, Pearce, 2003). This is where 
carbon markets and timber certification systems come in (Pearce, 2003). With the premium 
timber prices attached to FSC certification and the extra funding from carbon offsets (see 
INFAPRO), companies are more likely to go for SFM. As such, the Sabah state government 
would be looking more into SFM opportunities to prevent further degradation of the state s 
forest reserves.  
The traditional way of funding conservation projects in Malaysia is basically dependent of 
government budget or private sector contributions. Rahim from WWF Sabah said that this is 
increasingly hard to come by and there is a steady decrease of international funding as well as 
Malaysia slowly loses its status as a developing country. International organisations prefer to 
send funds to Indonesia instead. As such, the use of market schemes is slowly being 
recognised as important in funding future conservation efforts. However, Cynthia Ong from 
LEAP is still cautious on this front due to the lack of knowledge within the NGO community 
regarding market systems. The Sabah government for the moment is keen to explore future 
options in voluntary carbon offset projects. 
Table 5-1 Summary of stakeholder perspectives 
Stakeholder group Perspectives Common themes 
                                                
 
21 Gabriel Chong, personal communication, April 2008 
22 Rahimatsah Amat and Cynthia Ong, personal communication, April 2008 
23
 Cynthia Ong, personal communication, April 2008 
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Government o PES options are worth exploring and Malua 
would make an interesting pilot case 
o No need for legal obligation as yet. For now, it is 
sufficient to depend on the goodwill and desire of 
buyers to enhance their environmental portfolio 
o Restoration of remaining forests is a bigger 
priority than protection.  
o Interested in promoting SFM projects like 
Deramakot. 
o There has to be strong stakeholder participation 
and process transparency for investor confidence 
Palm Oil 
Businesses 
o Transparency is very important. Need third party 
verification. 
o Prefer regulatory due to uniformity as same 
requirement applied to the rest of the industry 
o More information is required. Depends heavily on 
management plan of the bank 
Investors/ 
Customers 
o No immediate plans to participate 
o Main environmental impact is through operations 
and that is where focus should be 
o Main aim at the moment is to source and 
purchase certified palm oil 
o Could be a good complement to other 
sustainability initiatives but more information is 
required 
o Doubtful if balanced trade off is really made 
Industry 
Organisations 
o There should be strong incentives to drive 
demand. Unsure if there will be sufficient interest 
or demand otherwise. 
o RSPO certification priority at the moment 
 
industry will opt for whatever the market 
demands  
o More details are needed regarding operation and 
management of bank especially with regards to 
accountability and transparency. 
Others o Useful way of generating funds for conservation 
o There is a real risk of green washing. Damage 
caused by large scale oil palm cultivation can 
never be compensated for. 
o Lack local knowledge and expertise on PES 
schemes. 
o Local and indigenous communities need to be 
recognised as stakeholders. 
o Financial mechanisms are important for 
conservation. Forests have to be able to compete 
with alternative land uses.  
o Unsure how the issue of permanence can be 
addressed  
o Strong concern regarding 
transparency and 
accountability 
o Debate on whether such 
schemes result in a 
balanced tradeoff 
o Important role in the 
generation of conservation 
funds 
o Strong drivers are required 
before demand can be 
generated 
o Lack of information and 
knowledge at the moment  
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6 Analysis  
6.1 Regulatory or Voluntary? 
Taking into account the U.S. experience with biodiversity offsets and conservation banking, it 
was clear that the main driver for demand of credits was the regulatory requirement of 
compensatory mitigation. In both the CWA and ESA, whether it is the destruction of 
wetlands or the loss of species, developers are required to adequately compensate for the 
impacts of their actions. At the moment, it is difficult to say whether a voluntary or regulatory 
approach would work best in Sabah as the details of the Malua bank is still preliminary. Even 
so, a regulatory approach could solve potential conflicts with regards to transparency and 
permanence. The pros and cons of a regulatory versus voluntary approach towards 
biodiversity offsets is summarised in Table 6-1.  
Table 6-1: Voluntary vs. Regulatory approaches in conservation banking.  
Voluntary Regulatory 
Generally driven by public relations or in anticipation 
of coming regulatory obligation. As such voluntary 
schemes may not be sufficient to drive demand. 
Legally mandated offsets result in strong demand for 
credits as shown by the U.S. experience in wetland 
mitigation banking and conservation banking schemes.
 
Since participation is voluntary, it may be among the 
first things to be axed in order to save cost when the 
business hit hard times. 
Due to support from proper legislation, requirements 
are equal across the board. Developers are also clear 
on the nature, scope and cost of their legal obligations.
Biodiversity offset schemes are potentially 
controversial. Instead of being welcomed by NGOs, 
an improperly designed scheme may attract scrutiny 
and negativity opening up potential risks and liabilities 
for the company. For this reason, companies may be 
reluctant to take part in offsets if there is no legal 
obligation. 
Too much regulation may limit the flexibility and of 
offset design at the expense of what is best for 
biodiversity. 
Legally mandated offsets exist in so few countries that 
voluntary schemes allow for compensation in a much 
broader range of countries. 
Regulations can stipulate a predefined compensation 
ratio or weight that could result in larger scale offsets 
than what was damaged.  
Source: ten Kate et al. (2004) and Fox & Nino-Murcia (2005). 
With the existence of regulations, there would be proper allocation of responsibility and all 
participants of the scheme would be clear on the nature of their obligations and liabilities. 
Regulation can also address the issue of credibility and the license to trash accusation. If 
made into a legal obligation, required compensation would be equal to (if not more than) the 
scale of damage incurred because proper mitigation ratios would need to be calculated. This 
also adds credibility, uniformity and acceptance to the scheme as conservation groups and 
concerned customers would be assured that a balanced (or as close as possible) trade off was 
made. In a voluntary scheme, it would be up to the companies (buyers) to determine the 
amount of credits to purchase and there is no indication if an appropriate offset was achieved. 
This is also damaging for the company as the purchase of offset credits does not necessarily 
buy them the good public relations that they are aiming for. 
Having said that, it should be recognised that enforcement and implementation may be 
problematic even with proper regulations in place. For example, Section 12 of the National 
Forestry Act 1984 requires that an equal area of land excised from permanent forest reserves 
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be replaced if suitable land is available. This in effect could allow for the future introduction of 
a legally mandated offset scheme. However, Section 12 is rarely enforced and the clause if 
suitable land is available creates a big loophole that allows replacement of excised forests to 
be ignored24.  
6.2 Challenges 
Based on the findings from stakeholder interviews, the potential challenges for the 
implementation of biodiversity banking in Malaysia are identified as follows: 
o Permanence 
o Transparency 
o Credibility  risk of greenwash? 
o Additionality  
o Knowledge Gap 
o Social Equity 
Like most ecosystem markets, there is a question of permanence as nature is not stationary but 
always in flux. What happens if there was a natural disaster, spread of disease or a forest fire 
that severely damages the bank ? The issue of permanence has been raised in most studies 
and reports on biodiversity offsets and there appears to be no easy answers to the issue. 
Conservation banking easements in the U.S. are supposed to be in perpetuity but how this 
actually works out in reality is a challenge especially when the land ownership changes 
(Fleischer & Fox, 2008). This is also the case in Malaysia. Most forested land falls under state 
jurisdiction and this may cause problems as state governments tend not to be very transparent 
when dealing with land issues. Gabriel Chong from Wetlands International mentioned that 
they faced problems trying to qualify their mangrove rehabilitation projects in Sabah for VERs 
due to this very issue. There was a lack of confidence in the permanence of their projects as 
the wetlands in questions are on state land and could be easily gazetted for development.  
Transparency with regards to fund management is essential for investor confidence. 
Documentation has to be clear and an independent third party is most likely required to audit 
and verify that the conservation objectives are being met. However this author feels that it 
would be rather difficult to avoid a conflict of self interest when establishing these sort of 
schemes if the land is owned by the state and the state oversees the management and 
implementation of the project as well. So far, LEAP is satisfied with the transparency of the 
discussions leading up to setting up of the bank and the CMP. SFD has also stressed that they 
view the issue of transparency very seriously and would ensure that all relevant stakeholders 
would be consulted along the way.  
The lack of transparency can lead to problems relating to perverse incentives as well. If the 
state is not clear on how future sites are chosen for offset schemes, the state can afford to reap 
the short term benefits of unsustainable logging practices (business as usual) and then 
conveniently turn the degraded forest into a voluntary offset project to gain external resources 
                                                
 
24 Rahimatsah Amat, Personal Communication, April 2008 
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to fund rehabilitation and reforestation activities and yet somehow appear to be contributing 
to conservation. This appears to be win-win for the state, the logging companies and the 
corporations that require the offset credits but it is definitely a loss where nature is concerned. 
Furthermore, if future projects for PES continue to take place inside permanent forest 
reserves like the case of Malua, it does not address the issue of protection of land that lies 
outside this reserve. So basically, the government is merely conserving what falls under their 
protection anyway albeit in a more cost effective manner. Consequently, this also raises the 
question of additionality. Is it still business as usual for the logging concessionaires? 
State officials have announced that the purchase of biodiversity credits will be voluntary. 
However, studies based on the U.S. experience concluded that regulatory obligation was a key 
factor in driving the demand for credits. If made into regulatory requirement, how will 
industries and businesses that would be affected by the requirement react? Take the example 
of palm oil industry who are finding the RSPO certification burdensome (but necessary) in 
terms of time and resources required. There are already some criticisms regarding the 
marginalisation of smallholders as they are not able to invest the time and money on the 
tedious certification process. Will the legal requirement of credit purchase add to that resulting 
only in large corporations being able to contribute to the trading scheme? On the other hand, 
without legislative support, will the scheme lack credibility? Who will be held accountable for 
non-conformance? Will the lack of legislative support bring on more doubts to the issue of 
permanence and transparency? 
Local NGOs lack expertise and in depth knowledge regarding PES (payment for ecosystem 
services) schemes like biodiversity banking. This means that there is more dependence on 
external groups (international organizations) that have various agendas. Therefore, NGOs may 
not be well equipped to critique a certain scheme as in they are not able to ask the right 
questions. The same thing would apply to government agencies involved. Assuming they have 
the right intentions 
 
meaning a genuine interest in conservation are they able to make the 
best informed decision when approving, implementing and monitoring the projects?  
Due to the relative newness of the scheme to Malaysia, there appeared to be a lack of 
knowledge as well among the companies interviewed. The lack of knowledge may result in a 
lack of interest and possible misconceptions on how biodiversity banking works. In order to 
attract potential buyers, information dissemination to businesses would be crucial. 
The Malua bank is restorative in nature (the land is degraded and rehabilitation will be the key 
activity to generate credits) and ecological certainty would be more difficult to achieve that 
banks that just require maintenance. Extensive ecological knowledge is required to be able to 
meet conservation objectives.   
The issue of social equity is somewhat outside the scope of this study. However, from the 
interviews, there is clearly a difference in opinion on how the rights of local and indigenous 
communities should be addressed. In the case of Malua, there are no communities living in the 
reserve hence the perception that they are a non-issue in the bank s establishment. However, 
some NGOs may disagree with this.   
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6.3 What are the possibilities? 
An imaginary company called Company X, wished to develop 50 hectares of forested land 
which has been logged over. The last logging cycle was about a decade ago and since then, the 
area has been left to regenerate on its own with minimal disturbance. As such, the forest 
concerned is not in pristine condition but provides a relatively good habitat for a variety of 
birds and small mammals, several of which are considered threatened species. The forest also 
serves as a wildlife corridor to a nearby forest reserve. Since the area concerned is 50 hectares, 
and EIA is required by law.  Due to the socio-economic benefits derived from the project, the 
EIA was approved with some measures to be taken to prevent and/ or minimise certain 
impacts. However due to the ecological value of the site, the project has attracted some 
negative feedback from the media and local conservation groups.  
Based on this hypothetical case and the findings from this study, three possible scenarios are 
presented in Figure 6-1 to illustrate the effects of a voluntary biodiversity offset scheme like 
the Malua bank project in a Malaysian context. A fourth scenario which is a business as 
usual scenario is included as a baseline to show the potential additional benefits or drawbacks 
an offset scheme might bring as compared to not having one. There could be other possible 
scenarios but for the sake of simplicity, only these ones will be described.  
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Scenario A 
After Company X addresses 
mitigation issues required by the 
EIA, it is still legally obligated to 
compensate for the residual effects 
by way of a biodiversity offset. After 
assessing the alternatives, Company 
X chooses to buy biodiversity offset 
credits. A compensation ratio is 
calculated and Company X buys 3 
credits for every hectare developed 
under the project. 
Scenario D 
 
Business as Usual
There is no voluntary offset scheme 
in place and no legislative 
requirement for an offset. Company 
X complies with mitigation 
requirements stated in the EIA. As it 
is a potentially controversial project, 
Company X decides to take part in 
environmental initiatives for public 
relation purposes. Company X 
decides to pledge Y amount of 
money to an existing conservation 
fund for wildlife administered by a 
consortia of NGOs. 
Scenario C 
Company X is under no obligation to 
offset the impacts of its development 
project. The existing biodiversity banking 
scheme is still rather new and owing to a 
lack of information and transparency, 
Company X decides to adopt a wait and 
see  approach and not participate in the 
scheme. Company X is worried about 
potential liabilities and added NGO 
scrutiny that may come with the possibly 
controversial scheme. Conscious of the 
importance of a green corporate image, 
Company X explores other more 
accepted methods to contribute to 
environmental conservation. 
Scenario B 
There is no legal requirement for 
offsets. However due to media 
scrutiny and concerns raised by 
conservation groups over the 
controversial development project, 
Company X chooses to buy credits 
from a biodiversity bank. As it is a 
purely voluntary scheme, it is up to 
Company X to determine how many 
credits to purchase. Company X buys 
1 credit for every hectare developed. 
Potential outcomes 
for voluntary 
biodiversity offset 
Figure 6-1: Possible scenarios when introducing a voluntary offset scheme. 
Scenario A is what one might consider as a win-win situation. Here, compensatory mitigation 
of habitats adversely impacted by development is required by law similar to ESA in the United 
States (This is currently not in place in Malaysia at the moment). This would mean that 
Company X would have to compensate for the residual damage caused by its project in some 
way. Among other alternatives, this could mean setting aside some land within the 50 hectares 
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for onsite conservation or acquiring another piece of land to be set aside for conservation. 
Faced with a set of alternatives, Company X prefers to purchase biodiversity credits from a 
bank. This solves many problems as Company X, with one time purchase, is able to pass on 
its responsibilities to a third party (the bank) and at the same time has the assurance that it has 
complied with all legal requirements. Since a proper offset need to be made to meet the legal 
obligations, a compensation ratio is calculated based on a defined set of guidelines. This 
results in larger scale offsets than what was damaged to ensure no net loss and instead 
achieve net benefits . Furthermore, because compensation of incurred damages is legally 
required, it creates demand and it doing so, it becomes profitable to generate supply. Although 
majority of the land in Malaysia is under the jurisdiction of the state, private landowners like 
plantation companies may see a benefit in setting aside part of their land as a biodiversity 
bank. For example, an oil palm plantation company may see a benefit in setting aside a parcel 
of its own land as a biodiversity bank to generate credits for its operations. 
In Scenario B compensatory mitigation is not required by law. As such it is up to the good will 
of Company X to contribute to biodiversity conservation and to build up its brand image. 
Company X chooses how many credits it wishes to buy to compensate for its impacts. The 
resulting compensation may or may not be adequate. However, Company X will be able to use 
its involvement with the biodiversity banking scheme as having contributed to conservation 
even though it could be a case of replacing apples with oranges . Even so, the sale of 
biodiversity credits does channel funds to conserve or restore forests (the bank) leading to an 
added environmental benefit that may or may not have occurred otherwise. Whether or not 
the added benefit is sufficient to compensate for the damage or loss of habitat is debatable 
and there may be a risk that good quality habitat is destroyed only to be compensated with a 
habitat of poorer quality. The presence of a banking scheme may hide this potential imbalance 
as all parties perceive that something positive is being done which is the voluntary purchase of 
credits to compensate or offset damages.  
However, if there is a lack of clarity as to how the biodiversity banking scheme is conducted in 
the absence of regulatory requirements and official guidelines, it could result in decreased 
confidence in the scheme. Lacking transparency and credibility, Scenario C may occur. 
Company X may be reluctant to associate itself with a potentially controversial scheme that 
may attract negative attention and public scrutiny (as pointed out in Table 6-1). Furthermore, 
in such a situation, NGOs themselves may be dubious as to the effectiveness of the banking 
scheme. It is simply not worth the risk for Company X if there is no legal requirement to do 
so. Company X may choose to adopt a wait and see approach before making a decision to 
participate. Instead Company X may choose to adopt tried and tested methods such as 
certification schemes or conservation funds as these are already accepted and recognised by 
NGOs and government agencies. Furthermore, due to the voluntary nature of the scheme and 
the uncertain benefits, Company X may be concerned that engagement in the scheme would 
put it at a competitive disadvantage as investment in the credits will entail higher operation 
costs (competitors may choose not to invest in scheme).  
In Scenario D, Company X just abides to its current legal obligations which do not require any 
mitigation offsets. However, conscious that environmental controversy can affect company 
image and hence business profitability, Company X decides to undertake conservation 
projects that have high NGO acceptability and therefore improve its own corporate image. 
Thus, Company X may contribute to one-off contributions to existing conservation funds or 
engage in active partnerships with local NGOs or state agencies to invest in projects that bring 
environmental benefits. Alternately, Company X could look into improving its own business 
operations such as green purchasing, minimizing waste, cleaner production and so forth as a 
means of strengthening its commitment towards sustainability. Whichever option Company X 
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chooses may still benefit the environment as a whole depending on the strength and sincerity 
of the company s commitment. However, the extent of benefits to the environment is still 
debatable. In this scenario, there is a possibility that Company X s contribution does not equal 
the damage incurred. There is also a risk of green washing as Company X may choose 
projects that would give it a higher media profile for marketing purposes and not projects that 
truly bring added conservation benefits. 
It would appear that Scenario A would bring the most benefit as the presence of regulatory 
compliance and a predefined compensation ratio would improve transparency and credibility 
of the scheme and at the same time create a strong market demand for the credits. It is unclear 
if legally mandated compensation will be required anytime soon and at the moment it is likely 
that the Sabah government will take the voluntary approach. As such, there is a possibility of a 
situation similar to Scenario B.  
In the case of Sabah, most of the forest reserves are degraded and PES mechanisms like the 
Malua banking project can go a long way into ensuring adequate funding for restoration 
activities that are too taxing on current state budget. Aside from that, market mechanisms like 
the Malua bank can generate economic incentives that allow it to compete with alternative 
land uses and thus reduce the likelihood of alienation for oil palm cultivation. In the absence 
of PES type projects, the degraded land loses both its economic and conservation value. 
Firstly, it is no longer able to produce good quality timber and secondly, it is also no longer a 
viable habitat for wildlife. Rehabilitation requires large funds that the government may not be 
able to spare and this just supports justification for conversion to other purposes. 
If successful, the Malua bank may pave the way to other PES projects in Sabah or in Malaysia 
as a whole. Just like how the Deramakot project has served as a model for SFM initiatives, the 
Malua bank can serve as a model for an innovative conservation tool for the region. In the 
event that the banking scheme can effectively channel the benefits down to local and 
indigenous communities, it could have the extra benefit contributing towards poverty 
alleviation while maintaining the traditional way of life and thus reducing the need to always 
rely on industry and cash crop cultivation as a means to overcome poverty.   
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7 Conclusion 
The simple fact is much of the forests in Sabah are degraded. The wildlife suffers from habitat 
loss and fragmentation caused by agriculture (predominantly oil palm estates) and decades of 
unsustainable logging practices. One of the main focuses of the SFD is to rehabilitate the 
degraded forests for SFM projects and wildlife conservation. This would require huge 
resources and there is a strong need to find other sources of funding aside from government 
funds and donations from private corporations and environmental organizations. The Sabah 
government is certainly exploring its options in SFM and voluntary carbon markets as shown 
by Deramakot, INFAPRO and the RIL project. With the introduction of the Malua Wildlife 
Conservation Bank, the Sabah government is entering a new territory that can open up huge 
possibilities in other similar ventures. 
Why is it important for Sabah to venture into PES schemes? Economic development is a key 
priority for the government as highlighted by the 9th Malaysia Plan and the recent launch of 
the Sabah Development Corridor (SDC). Sabah has one of the highest poverty rates in the 
country and this will be used as a strong argument for giving development projects the green 
light in the name of poverty alleviation. Therefore there is a growing necessity to assign 
economic values to forests and ecosystem services to enable them to compete with other land 
use alternatives especially oil palm plantations.  
Although PES can be seen as a useful conservation tool, it is not without its drawbacks 
especially in the Malaysian context. Although already in use in many countries such as United 
States, Australia, Costa Rica and Brazil, knowledge in PES among government agencies, 
NGOs and the private sector in Malaysia is still pretty low. There is much potential to be 
tapped but in order to fully make use of it, there is a great need for capacity building among 
the relevant stakeholders. As pointed out in the Chapter 5, local stakeholders are currently 
reliant on external expertise in PES. External groups come with various agendas that may not 
necessarily be in sync with local needs. It is important for relevant government staff and local 
environmental NGOs to be well informed so that they can be empowered to make decisions 
that they are comfortable with and to question discrepancies when setting up a PES scheme 
like the upcoming Malua project.  
The Malua project is set up as a voluntary scheme for now. Currently, there is no federal or 
state regulation that endorses the use of an economic instrument such as mitigation banking. 
Since the proposed conservation bank is a state initiative, it is unlikely that a federal policy will 
be drawn up any time soon. The Sabah state government has not indicated any intention to 
include compensatory mitigation as a legal requirement for development projects. Instead, the 
Chief Minister merely hinted that the obligation of purchasing credits to offset impacts will be 
included in contract agreements with palm oil companies. The study by IUCN as well as other 
studies based on the U.S. conservation banking experience indicated that regulatory obligation 
is important and voluntary mechanisms may not work. Both wetlands mitigation banking and 
conservation banking have strong regulatory support in the U.S. in the form of CWA and 
ESA respectively as well as established guidelines by USFWS. In the case of Malua, whether 
sufficient demand can be generated sans legislation remains to be seen. Can international 
market forces play a big enough role to pressure businesses to improve the green image of 
palm oil for trade purposes? There is most likely a need to extend the market to include other 
buyers. The challenge here would be to have both a strong and convincing business plan and 
conservation management plan to attract potential investors. 
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In the US, majority of the land is privately owned and with strict legislation in place regarding 
mitigation requirements, landowners are compelled to turn to conservation banking to gain 
economic returns from their land. The incentive to turn their lands into conservation banks is 
quite clear. Land in Sabah (including forests), like the rest of Malaysia, is mostly state owned 
and it is at the prerogative of the respective state governments to set aside forest land as 
banks. There could be implications in terms of vested interests as most things would fall under 
government authority. This also brings about the question of permanence. Ownership lies 
with the state government. This means that the government can choose to strengthen its 
commitment to conserve the bank into perpetuity or choose to convert the land to other 
purposes with relative ease compared to private owners especially in the absence of official 
guidelines specific to biodiversity banking. In order to build trust and confidence in the 
system, if the Malaysian government intends to develop similar projects like Malua, it is crucial 
to first introduce official guidelines. 
Transparency in the use of revenue generated by the sale of credits will be a key issue. 
Potential buyers will need assurance that rehabilitation is indeed taking place and the 
objectives and targets set out by the Malua CMP are being met. Actual details on how 
monitoring and verification will be conducted are still unclear. It appears that YS and SFD are 
the key players in this but due to the poor track record in governance and transparency (as 
discussed in Chapter 3) an independent third party auditor would be essential to gain 
confidence and trust. 
For conservation to be successful, community participation and engagement is crucial. 
Benefits from the Malua project should trickle down to indigenous or local communities who 
are somehow dependent on the Malua forest. For the credits to be acceptable and credible, the 
rights of indigenous communities have to be acknowledged and respected. This can be rather 
difficult in Malaysia where indigenous communities are still marginalized and the laws 
protecting native rights are still weak in structure and enforcement.  
When discussing the use of environmental markets, the concepts of green washing and 
license to trash are never far from the minds of detractors. This is probably true in the 
Malua case as well. The reality is that there is always some sort of a trade-off between 
conservation and profits. The best anyone can do is to ensure that the environment gets a fair 
share of the cake. The execution of the banking scheme is important. If there is a genuine 
commitment from the government to maintain the conservation status of Malua Forest 
Reserve and all management activities are done in a responsible and transparent manner, then 
at the end of the day, the environment will still benefit. 
The debate over the sustainability of palm oil production and its suitability as a biofuel 
feedstock will most likely continue for some time. At the moment the palm oil industry in 
Malaysia is clamouring to get their products certified according to RSPO guidelines to meet 
the environmental requirements of the international market. Although RSPO certification is 
the top priority at the moment, it is likely that the industry will be open towards any 
conservation initiative that can further boost their portfolio. However, in terms of using the 
biodiversity credits (or carbon credits for that matter) may not be sufficient as it only 
addresses their impact on land use which is the loss of forests and wildlife habitats. There is a 
lot more to the palm oil industry then just the plight of the orang utans, a favourite attention 
grabber among NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth International. True, oil palm 
cultivation and deforestation are closely linked but there are other negative impacts that are 
just as important such as pesticide and fertilizer use, waste and effluent from downstream 
processing and encroachment into native lands. It would be more constructive at the moment 
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for the industry to address these issues in relation to RSPO criteria. It is also more relevant for 
focus to be made in increasing the oil yield per hectare to increase supply instead of plantation 
expansion. 
Only time will tell if the Malua Wildlife Conservation Bank project is a success story or a 
cautionary tale. Either way, this author feels that the introduction of the Malua project is an 
important step in shaping future conservation efforts in Malaysia. There appears to be a 
genuine interest from all sides affiliated with the project for it to succeed. If successful, the 
Malua bank can serve as a model case for the country and the region as a whole. Even if the 
bank were to falter and stumble along the way, key learning points can still be gathered for 
further improvement in future endeavours.  
7.1 Potential areas for future research 
At the completion of this study, the Malua project is still undergoing negotiations and the 
details have yet to be finalized. It would be of interest to continue looking at the future 
development of the project especially once the Conservation Management Plan (CMP) has 
been released for public scrutiny. 
At the moment, it is still unclear if the Malua bank project can or will adequately address the 
issue of local forest dependent communities. Although this study does not address this issue 
either, it is recognized that community participation and engagement is important when 
launching such schemes. This is especially relevant to the Borneon states of Sabah and 
Sarawak where there are higher incidences of poverty among rural communities. The issue of 
native rights is also a hot issue in Malaysia and the indigenous communities are still 
marginalized in many development projects and as a whole have very weak land ownership 
rights. Therefore, much work can be done on how to actively engage local communities in 
conservation projects and how they can benefit from PES schemes in Malaysia. 
There is an urgent need to effectively protect what is left of Malaysian forests as well as 
rehabilitate the degraded areas. In terms of rehabilitation, one of the main problems is funding 
and there is a lot of potential to generate the funds either through CDM carbon sequestration 
projects or voluntary markets. It could be worthwhile to look into the different kinds of 
schemes that can be employed and how and which has the highest potential of success and 
stakeholder acceptance. This of course could vary depending on the States due to local 
conditions, resources and government objectives. 
Another contentious issue would be the regulatory versus voluntary approach. Should the 
purchase of credits be a regulatory requirement? Although, it is preferable in the sense that it 
might reflect an actual offset , it could be perceived as burdensome by developers. The 
readiness of the existing legislative framework and regulatory capacity is another issue in 
imposing a regulatory requirement. Can existing legislative frameworks support this and how? 
Would a voluntary approach like the proposed Malua scheme work better for now?   
The study was initially designed based on information from press releases as further 
information was still unavailable at that time. As such, only palm oil related businesses were 
targeted as potential buyers. It could be interesting to look at other potential players such as 
government agencies themselves (highway construction), property developers and other 
industries (e.g. pulp and paper) that involve conversion of land into monocrop plantations.   
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Abbreviations  
BBOP  Business and Biodiversity Offset Programme 
CAC  Command and Control 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CHP  Comprehensive Harvesting Plan 
CMP  Conservation Management Plan 
CPO  Crude Palm Oil 
CWA  Clean Water Act 
DVCA  Danum Valley Conservation Area 
EIA  Environment Impact Assessment 
ESA  Endangered Species Act 
FACE  Forests Absorbing Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FELDA  Federal Land Development Authority 
FMP  Forest Management Plan 
FMPT  Forest Management Planning Team 
FMU  Forest Management Unit 
FRIM  Forest Research Institute Malaysia 
FSC  Forest Stewardship Council 
GRASP  Great Apes Survival Project 
GTZ  German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
ICSB  Innoprise Corporation Sdn. Bhd. (Innoprise Corporation Private Limited) 
IIED  International Institute for Environment and Development 
INFAPRO Innoprise-FACE Foundation Rainforest Rehabilitation Project 
IPOSC  International Palm Oil Sustainability Conference 
IUCN  International Union for Conservation of Nature 
LEAP  Land Empowerment Animals People 
MIDA  Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
MPOA  Malaysian Palm Oil Association 
MPOB  Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
MPOC  Malaysian Palm Oil Council 
NGO  Non-governmental organisation 
PACOS  Partners of Community Organisations 
PES  Payment for Ecosystem Services 
PFE  Permanent Forest Estate 
POIC  Palm Oil Industrial Cluster 
PRF  Permanent Reserved Forest 
REDD  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
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RSPO  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
SDC  Sabah Development Corridor 
SFD  Sabah Forestry Department 
SFM  Sustainable Forest Management 
SFMLA  Sustainable Forest Management License Agreement 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
USFWS  United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
USM  Ulu Segama-Malua 
WWF  World Wide Fund for Nature 
YS  Yayasan Sabah (Sabah Foundation) 
YSFMA  Yayasan Sabah Forest Management Area 
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